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ABSTRACT
The Problem of Prayer in School: A Discussion of Legal Interpretation and Policy
By
Staci Lynn Brick
Dr. Jerry Simich, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The problem of prayer in public schools is a divisive one that has grown out of a 
changing and confusing interpretation of the Establishment Clause with respect to school 
activities. Traditionally and historically, the United States has recognized public praise 
of God in a nonsectarian manner; however, this type of religious activity has been 
deemed unconstitutional in the school setting. The United States Supreme Court has 
also allowed public financial support of religion while vehemently disallowing symbolic 
religious support in public schools. The accomodationists on the Court has prevailed in 
most venues except school, where the separationists have managed to force a wedge 
between religious practice and the school setting. This varying interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause that is dependent on the time, place, and manner of government 
support has created a maze of incongruent, incomprehensible precedent that has denied 
the democratic nature of the American system of government. Some simple changes in 
policy toward state-endorsed religious activities could restore the American school to its 
traditional and democratic purpose in regards to religious education.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
Many of the colonies that gave birth to the United States were founded for 
religious freedom by religious zealots. This paradox is fundamental to the religious 
tradition in the United States. The First Amendment of the Constitution starts, “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.” (United States Constitution) When the government hires chaplains to minister 
to military persoimel, excuses practitioners of the Jewish faith from school or from 
government jobs on Jewish holidays, or allows religious student organizations to meet 
and to teach on public school campuses, these clauses may even come into direct conflict 
with each other. (Center for Civic Education 1999) One of the most controversial clashes 
between the clauses began in 1962 with the Supreme Court decision in Engel v. Vitale 
(370 U.S. 421). The war continues though the constitutional battlegrounds have changed, 
and the opinion of the majority of Americans has consistently been squarely opposed to 
the decisions of the Court. (Green and Guth 1989; Jacoby 1990; Servin- Gonzalez and 
Torres-Reyna 1999) Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s right and duty to make 
unpopular decisions when called upon to do so by the principles of the Constitution, the 
decisions regarding school prayer seem out of step not only with the democratic nature of 
the United States but also with the interpretation of the Establishment Clause in regard to 
other areas in which religion and state often commingle.
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Literature Review
Since 1962, scholars have noted the diversity of interpretation to which the 
Establishment Clause is subject, especially in regard to issues involving schooling. 
Modem Court opinions on prayer in public school seem to follow a natural progression 
from Engel v. Vitale in 1962 (370 U.S. 421) to 2000’s Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe (530 U.S. 290). Each case in the progression further restricts prayer on 
school grounds and at school-sponsored activities. Where the Court begins to contradict 
itself is in aligning these prayer cases with other types of Establishment Clause cases, 
such as school funding or public display cases. This should come as no surprise to a 
student of the Court, since Establishment Clause interpretation in these areas seems 
inconsistent and mired in lists of exceptions to constitutional rules.
Prior to 1947, the Establishment Clause had no bearing on school prayer or 
funding, because that part of the Constitution applied only to the federal government. 
(Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1) Writing in 1951, Lynford Lardner described 
the inherent problems with Establishment Clause interpretations, including problems 
interpreting the wording of the clause, problems of tradition and custom, and problems 
defining the extent of the limitation on Congress. (Lardner 1951) All of these problems 
were at least exacerbated by the incorporation of the provision to the states, which then 
had to consider their own constitutions as well as their traditional or ceremonial practices.
The Everson decision fundamentally altered powers of the several states with 
regard to government involvement in religion and complicated the interpretation of the 
establishment clause. Since the time of colonial occupation of North America by the 
British, colonies or states had controlled religious freedom and toleration statutes. Early
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in the history of the United States, several key founders had argued that religious matters 
were to be handled by these smaller units of government, since they were closer to the 
people. The federal government, however, has been steadily increasing its power over 
the state governments at least since the end of the Civil War, and the national government 
has exerted a steady stream of increasing influence over protections of individual rights 
and matters of religion. National laws aimed at defense and education purposes have a 
significant effect on religious practices within states, even though the aims might be 
secular. Walfi-ed Peterson argued in 1963 that national legislation and case law 
concerning religion exert a pressure for uniformity and caused conflict when state and 
local agencies acted in defiance of national policy in order to protect their own traditions. 
(Peterson 1963)
As the Supreme Court set to the task of defining the Establishment Clause for 
application to state governments, it was clear to William Van Alstyne that the definition 
given from case to case was incoherent. At first, he claimed, the Court’s view was overly 
restrictive while at the same time making an exception for the parochial school aid 
program in question, such as in Everson (1947, 330 U.S. 1) in which the Court purported 
to establish a strict separation between church and state while still allowing the state to 
bus students to parochial schools. Uncomfortable with the dismissal by the Court of 
pertinent historical argument. Van Alstyne suggested that the Court needed to interpret 
the Establishment Clause in light of the Free Exercise Clause. He argued that the two are 
complementary rather than contradictory, and that the Court could abandon some of its 
more confusing and disturbing arguments by interpreting the two clauses as one 
provision. (Van Alstyne 1963)
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William Carroll agreed that Establishment Clause interpretation lacks consistency 
from case to case, even resulting in a rare Court occurrence; the overturning of a 
previously established precedent when the Zorach (1952,343 U.S. 306) case overturned 
a Court restriction, set only a few years previously, against release time for students for 
the purpose of religious education. Carroll argued that the broad interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause as meaning that the state can in no way support religious activity is 
unwieldy and unrealistic. In order to counteract this, the Court has developed a system of 
exceptions to the rule. These exceptions revolve mainly around the concepts of state 
neutrality, fi-ee exercise, and secular purpose. The last of the tests presents the biggest 
problem in Establishment Clause interpretation and may result in the nullification of 
some laws that protect free exercise. Carroll suggested that the Court develop a 
definition for “religion” that is suitable for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment 
Clauses since the Court appears to be using a different definition for each. In order for 
one definition to be equally applicable, it must include belief and non-belief. (Carroll 
1967)
A 1985 study of school prayer supporters by Elifson and Hadaway identified 
school prayer as a particularly religious and political issue, particularly salient to older 
Southern Protestant with little education. Supporters of school prayer tended to be more 
likely to be conservative also. Though a majority of the United States approves of prayer 
in public school. Congress has failed in its attempts to create a constitutional amendment. 
According to the study, this failure may be attributable to the difficulty inherent in 
writing an amendment that would be acceptable to the many disparate Christian groups 
on the school prayer bandwagon. This is a problem in the wider school prayer issue, as
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these groups may agree, conceptually, that there should be a prayer, but argue over how 
the prayer should be written and or delivered. Many challenges to school prayer 
activities have come from persons of faith objecting to the wording, style, or delivery of 
the prayer in question. Also, since these groups tend to come from less politically 
powerful demographic groups, allowing Congress to get by on mere lip service to the 
amendment movement. (Elifson and Hadaway 1985)
One of tiie reasons for the continued discontent among the American public is the 
perception of challengers to school prayer activities as members of marginal religious 
sects. Though this perception may be largely false when it comes to school prayer, a 
1983 study by Way and Burt found some Court bias in favor of marginal religious sects. 
Between 1970 and 1980, Establishment and Free Exercise Clause challenges made my 
members of marginal sects, those religions not associated with a Judeo-Christian 
tradition, were successful over 55% of the time, while challenges brought by mainline 
Protestant succeeded only 34% of the time, with slightly higher success rates for 
Catholics and litigants of Jewish faith. According to Way and Burt, this alarming trend 
shows the willingness of the Court to set aside the rights of the majority of religious 
people in order to protect the rights of those of marginal faiths when they come into 
conflict. (Way and Burt 1983) In fact, in discussions of school prayer, even in Court 
opinions, it is the respect for the views of those of marginal religious sects that often 
causes the Court to reject any notion of school-sponsored prayer activity.
In 1985, Frank Way suggested that the way to stabilize the issue of Establishment 
Clause interpretation was to shift power back to communities. Prior to Engel, courts 
upheld public piety statutes on the basis of old blasphemy precedent, deference to
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legislatures, and démocratie values. Also, states deciding the constitutionality of school 
prayer, resolved the issue in single cases, 75% of which were unanimous, that were never 
appealed. Of twenty-three states that made prayer decisions, 16 upheld the prayers, 5 
struck them down, and two called for excuse mechanisms. (Way 1985)
A. James Reichley in 1986 contended that a Court, overly reliant on the Free 
Exercise Clause, had abandoned the tradition of acceptable government 
acknowledgement of religion in its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. His 
argument relied on references to the founders and to Alexis De Toque ville. Reichley did 
not claim that religion itself was the foundation of democracy, just that moral values, 
difficult to separate from religion itself, provided a foundation for democracy. (Reichley 
1986)
Leonard Levy, writing in the same year, contended that the founders intended, as 
the Court had solidified, to create a wall of separation between church and state, such that 
neither should interfere with the other. Levy argued that, based on the historical record, 
the founders intended a broad view of both the religion clauses, in order to prevent the 
kinds of religious persecution with which they were too familiar. Even support of 
religion in general by federal or state governments would be clearly proscribed by this 
view of the clauses. School prayer, though it may not favor any denomination or may not 
be coercive, would fall under this general support category and be unconstitutional in 
Levy’s view. (Levy 1986)
Green and Guth’s study of political activists explained the distance between 
Congress, the Courts, and the public on the issue of school prayer, as one attributable to 
the deep divide among political activists on the issue of school prayer. The general
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public seems to maintain a consistent majority in favor of school prayer tiiat does not 
exist among political activists. Activists, by definition are more involved in participation 
in government processes, providing a vital link between the people and their governing 
bodies. Activists are often also more informed about constitutional issues and about the 
inner workings of government institutions than are members of the general public.
Among this group, there is a clear majority against school prayer. (Green and Guth 
1989)
Much debate in the area of Establishment Clause interpretation revolves around 
the intent of the Framers of the amendment, especially James Madison. Answering 
accomodationists who had made claims that Madison was accommodating of religious 
practices as a fiumer, a Congressman, and a president, Thomas Lindsay reexamined 
Madison’s writings to argue that he was grudgingly accepting of only the most peripheral 
role of government in religious practice. Madison, after all, was a practical politician, 
faced with the same democratic pressures and deliberative processes that modem 
politicians face. Madison, however, was clearly dismayed at the public outcry for days of 
prayer and fasting during the War of 1812, and issued such ceremonial declarations only 
to quell the fiiror, insisting that he would never prescribe the manner in which these days 
would be observed or insist on observation at all. Madison later cringed at the fact that 
he felt forced to make the suggestion of days of prayer and fasting at all. Lindsay 1991)
A recent survey by Servin-Gonzales and Tores-Reyna in 1999 indicated that 
public support for a school prayer amendment depended directly on the amount of 
information respondents were given. The general public, given no information, 
consistently showed majorities in favor of prayer. When informed of the restrictions of
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the Establishment Clause or when it was implied that public school prayer would restrict 
the rights of parents to teach their children their own religious beliefs, support for the 
amendment was low. This may indicate that the general public wishes to support prayer 
but has little background knowledge of the purpose, meaning, and implications of the 
constitutional law surrounding the subject. (Servin-Gonzales and Torres-Reyna 1999)
The Problem
In the debate over the acceptability of prayer in public school, there are at least 
two easily definable opponents, and each side defines the problems associated with 
school prayer differently. Those who approve of school prayer see a problem with the 
deterioration of moral values and traditions in the American democracy. They also 
identify a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court as a 
problem that must be overcome and see the obstruction of state-sponsored school prayer 
as a violation of the concept of federalism. School prayer opponents believe that 
constitutional principles are at stake when a state sponsors a prayer. They argue that 
separation between church and state must be maintained in order to protect believers and 
non-believers fi-om undue state coercion in the area of religious beliefs. Both sides 
recognize inherent problems in the inconsistent interpretation of the salient constitutional 
clauses by the Supreme Court.
Those who believe that prayer in school is acceptable and fundamental to a 
solidly founded community find themselves aligned with a great tradition that spans from 
Plato (The Republic Book III) through Tocqueville (Democracv in America Volume 1 
Part 2 Chapter 9) and beyond. Though some may disagree with the validity of this
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philosophical tradition, a study by the Brookings Institution in 1985 found the argument 
for the religious foundations of democracy compelling at least. The study indicated some 
correlation between decline in religious activity and the increase in anti-social behavior 
such as crime, cynicism, and mistrust of social institutions. (Reichley) This side of the 
argument is largely defined by the concept that moral education, through school prayer, 
will lead to a safer and more stable society. The problem, as defined by the pro-prayer 
group, also called religious accomodationists, is that prayer in school is a necessary 
component of democracy and vital to the continuation of a free society.
Tradition is also a key focus of the pro-prayer debaters. Justice Potter Stewart, in 
his dissent in Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421), argued that school prayer is part of the 
heritage of the nation and that to deny the prayer would be to deny students a key part of 
American tradition. To this effect, he extensively footnoted references to God in 
accepted government activities, presidential speeches, and the Declaration of 
Independence. To the supporters of school prayer, this helps to define another problem 
meant to be answered by the use of a non-denominational non-coercive prayer in school, 
the disappearance or lack of tradition in the United States.
Federalism may also be at stake when the Supreme Court denies the right of a 
state to adopt a sponsored prayer. Many accomodationists point out that the First 
Amendment was written originally to limit the federal government only, as indicated by 
use of the word “Congress” at the outset of the Amendment. It was not meant to restrict 
the states, each having its own constitution and religious practices. (Peterson 1963) The 
Supreme Court, guided by the Fourteenth Amendment, changed the relationship between 
the states and the federal government with the decision in Everson v. Board o f Education
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(330 U.S. 1), giving the federal government more power over church-state relations.
Most accommodationists would argue that this fundamental change to the clause is an 
attack on the rights of states. (Peterson 1963)
Constitutionally, the accomodationists focus more on the importance of the Free 
Exercise Clause and on a narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In 1985, the 
Supreme Court struck down a mandated moment of silence for prayer in Alabama 
schools simply because the statute mentioned prayer as one of many student activities 
that could take place during that moment. (Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38) The Court 
interpreted the list of activities as a list of endorsed activities that should take place 
during the moment of silence, thereby placing the government stamp of approval on 
religious practice. In his dissent. Chief Justice Warren Burger relied mainly on an 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that would allow each student to practice his or 
her own religious beliefs, which would enjoy recognition and support by the school. 
Justice William Rehnquist dissented based on a traditional interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause that limited the effect of the clause to outright and obvious support 
of a specific religious belief or sect by the federal government. The accomodationists see 
the problem as one of allowing Free Exercise of religious beliefs within the constraints of 
the Establishment Clause.
Accomodationists share many demographic factors. School prayer advocates are 
more likely to be Southern, older, Christian, blue-collar workers with educational 
backgrounds often limited to the completion of high school. (Green and Guth 1989)
These demographics correlate well with the demographics of the Republican party, so it 
may come as no surprise that the Republican party platform has consistently contained a
10
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plank regarding a proposed School Prayer Amendment. (Janda 1999) A solid and stable
majority of the American public defines the problem of school prayer from the
accomodationist perspective. (Green and Guth 1989; Jacoby 1990; Servin- Gonzalez and
Torres-Reyna 1999) Therefore, the problem cannot be limited to either side of the
political aisle, although prayer may be one of many religious issues that have swung
congressional majorities and even the presidency into the hands of Republicans.
People who do not support prayer in school define the problem in a much
different manner. They rely on a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause as first
clearly delineated in the case of Everson v. Board o f Education (330 U.S. 1) which
incorporated the Establishment Clause to the states. Though there are exceptions, the
rule is basically defined as follows:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a pemon to go to or 
to remain away fi-om church against his will or force him to profess a 
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may 
be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice 
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of 
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church 
and State.' {Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1)
The separationists believe that there are fundamental constitutional values at stake that
have just as fine a tradition as the philosophical one claimed by the accomodationists.
This tradition springs fi*om the years of religious persecution and war in Europe and in
the early colonies. This history is referenced in Justice Hugo Black’s decisions in both
11
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Everson (330 U.S. 1) and Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421). For those opposed to state- 
sponsored prayer, non-belief holds and should maintain the same level of protection as 
any religious belief. (Carroll 1967) Therefore, one problem associated with prayer in 
school includes the danger of religious persecution or subtle coercion of non-believers.
It would be folly to suggest that separationists are all atheists, agnostics, or 
secular humanists. (Green and Guth 1985) In fact, the recent Texas suit regarding 
student-led prayer prior to football games was commenced by a Catholic and a member 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe 530 U.S. 290) Many fear that a close relationship between church and 
state is as harmful to religious practice as it is to state secular goals. (Van Alstyne 1963) 
People who disagree with state-sponsored prayer in school see a problem with the overt 
entanglement between state and religion. In the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court 
incorporated this definition of the problem into the official test for Establishment Clause 
cases. (401 U.S. 192)
The main difference in problem definition lies in the accepted method of 
Establishment Clause interpretation for each side. Accomodationists read the clause 
narrowly to allow non-denominational, non-coercive prayer, while separationists read the 
clause broadly to disallow any support of religion by the government, including any kind 
of recognized prayer activity. If the Court were consistent in its application of the 
Establishment Clause, it would give both sides an interpretation to agree on, but 
arguments continue based on many inconsistencies. Though the Court’s definition in 
Everson (330 U.S. 1) seemed like a steadfast rule, the justices immediately started to 
riddle the rule with exceptions. (Carroll 1967) The opinion in Everson actually
12
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
supported state funded busing to private schools. Since then, the Court has allowed 
release time for religious education (Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306), public school 
teachers providing secular education in private schools (Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203), 
and even direct public payment to private schools (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 
639). At the same time, the Court has prohibited non-denominational, non-coercive 
school prayer (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421), a mandated moment of silence for prayer 
(Wallace v. Jaffiee 472 U.S. 38), ceremonial prayer at graduation (fee  v. Weisman 505 
U.S. 577), and student-led ceremonial prayer at the beginning of school sporting events 
(Santa Fe Independent School District v. DOE 530 U.S. 290). If the problem is the 
ceremonial usage of religious ceremony in government sponsored activity, it is difficult 
to understand how the Court has allowed the use of the national motto, “In God We 
Trust,” on all U.S. currency, and chaplains in state and national legislative sessions. 
(Engel V. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) Both sides can recognize the major problem with school 
prayer policy in the United States is inconsistency in Establishment Clause interpretation 
on the part of the Court.
13
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CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORY OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INTERPRETATION
Because of the prohibition of the First Amendment against the enactment 
of any law ‘respecting an establishment of religion,’ which is made 
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, state officials may 
not compose an official state prayer and require that it be recited in the 
public schools of the State at the beginning of each school day - even if 
the prayer is denominationally neutral and pupils who wish to do so may 
remain silent or be excused from the room while the prayer is being 
recited.
Justice Hugo Black’s decision in Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) did more than end a 
practice of religious prayer in New York’s public schools, it touched off a wave of 
controversy that has stretched into the twenty-first century. Nationwide, school districts 
tried to maneuver around this new, broader interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 
Solutions ranged from moments of silent prayer and reflection (Wallace v. Jaffree 472 
U.S. 38) to ceremonial prayer at graduation (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) to student-led 
prayer at extracurricular activities (Santa Fe Independent School District v. DOE 530 
U.S. 290). None of these solutions was acceptable to the Court, and many school 
districts simply act in defiance of the Court’s decisions, silently hoping that no parent 
will bring legal action.
Much of the reason behind the search for loopholes and the acts of defiance can 
be found in the changing and inconsistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
itself. Its reluctant author, James Madison, penned the clause as a part of a broader
14
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statement of rights that he had promised to the Anti-Federalists in order to secure 
ratification of the Constitution. Citizens, to be sure, would be protected from a formal 
declaration of a national religion. (Annals I: 729-731) The new government had in fact 
grown out of colonies, some of which had been established solely for the purpose of 
freeing these new settlers from the bounds of established religions in Europe, therefore 
many citizens under the new Constitution thought it necessary to enact such a barrier 
between the matters of church and those of state. (Engel v. F i f / a / e  370 U.S. 421) The 
original interpretation of the clause, however, restricted only national governments and 
did not seem to prohibit some ceremonial sponsorship of religion in general. Through the 
Court’s doctrine of incorporation, the Establishment Clause was applied to the states in 
1947 in the case o f Everson v. Board o f Education. (330 U.S. 1) Since then, the special 
relationship between schools and religion has created a murky area of constitutional law.
There are three general methods of interpretation used by Supreme Court justices, 
and even scholars within these three schools differ in their interpretation of this 
seemingly simple statement in the First Amendment. The first method involves searching 
for the literal meaning of the words of the clause being interpreted, the second relies on 
the intent of the Framers of the provision, and the third involves the application of time- 
honored constitutional principles to modem problems. Some justices, typically described 
as conservative or restraintist, look to the words of the provision for insight into the true 
meaning and application of the clause to modem situations while others comb the 
historical record for clues as to the true intentions of the Framers of the Amendment. 
(Levy 1986) More liberal justices, often accused of being activist, take an evolutionary 
approach, viewing the Constitution as a living document, the principles of which must be
15
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shaped to match the changing needs of a new society. (Scalia 1998) Each method of 
interpretation has its flaws, and each presents a special challenge in Establishment Clause 
cases, which are often further complicated by the interplay between that clause and it’s 
sister, the Free Exercise Clause.
As a result of the different methods of interpretation, the changing makeup of the 
Court, and the continuous pull of public opinion, the Court has created a maze of 
definitions of the Establishment Clause, and many modem cases involving establishment 
of religion contradict each other or contradict precedent. The most glaring inconsistency 
comes in the application of the Establishment Clause to school prayer. Following a 
broad, evolutionary interpretation, the Court has stmck down any and all forms of 
government sponsored prayer in schools while allowing the government to sponsor the 
use of chaplains in state and national governments as well as the ceremonial use of 
religion on currency, and in patriotic songs sung in the school environment. {Engel v. 
Vitale 370 U.S. 421) They have disallowed use of prayer in extracurricular activities 
(Santa Fe Independent School District v. DOE 530 U.S. 290) while allowing religious 
clubs to meet on campus with a school advisor (BOE ofWestside Community Schools v. 
Mergens 496 U.S. 226) and direct monetary payments to private schools by the state. 
(Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639) As the Court moves to narrow the scope of 
the Establishment Clause in terms of monetary support to religious institutions, it has 
broadened the interpretation of state support in terms of prayer in school
16
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Church-State Relations in a Republic 
When the first known republic was established by the Greeks, there was no call 
for the separation of church and state activities. Early political philosophers found the 
two concepts inextricably tied together, and saw religion as a key function of the state. In 
The Republic. Plato lays out the design for a model government in which education must 
be the foundation for the state. Crucial to this state education was a common set of 
values taught to all children through the use of religious tales. (Plato The Republic Book 
III) Aristotle, writing many years after Plato, thought religion to be a necessary function 
of the state in order for the community to survive. (Aristotle Politics Book VII; viii) 
Classical republicans believed that the serenity of the state rested in part on uniformity in 
morality and civic goals, and that in order to achieve that uniform morality, religion 
should be supported by the state.
When the Roman Republic fell to its own imperialism, the early age of republics 
disappeared and was replaced by a new age of authoritarian rule. State sponsorship of 
religion in many parts of Europe gave way to religious sponsorship of the state. The 
Romans persecuted Jews and Christians; the Christians, separated in two sects, forced 
non-Christians into Eastern Europe where ethnic tension raged. Christians, Jews, and 
Muslims fought Holy Wars over sacred land, and the fire of expansionism was fueled by 
religious fervor. Popes and kings struggled with each other for power. Religion 
corrupted the state, and the state sullied religion. (Ellis, E. and Esler, A. 1999)
It was this unholy alliance between church and state, coupled with the rebirth of 
classical learning that led to the Reformation, the revolt against the Catholic Church in 
Western Europe. Whereas the Renaissance had led to the questioning of religious beliefs
17
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in matters of science, the Reformation invited inquisitive souls to seek their own 
salvation without assistance from church or state. It was from this revolutionary chain of 
events that the predecessor to the American ideology was bom. Enlightenment 
Philosophy. People began to see themselves as autonomous individuals who could seek 
their own salvation and make their own decisions regarding their govemance through the 
power of logic with which each man had been gifted at birth. (Ellis, E. and Esler, A. 
1999)
Many Protestant faiths faced persecution in Europe and fled to the American
colonies in order to escape the established churches of the old world. However, many of
those settlers created similarly entangled governments once they had created a
homogeneous community of their own, and their colonial charters reflect this urge to
sanctify their own colonial governments. (Center for Civic Education) Some Protestant
leaders, however, recognized a need for the some distinction, though not a clear one,
between church and state powers. John Calvin, a Protestant founder whose followers
faced discrimination in many parts of Northem Europe, wrote:
Nor let anyone think it strange that I now refer to human polity the charge 
of the due maintenance of religion, which I may appear to have placed 
beyond the jurisdiction of men. For I do not allow men to make laws 
respecting religion and the worship of God now, any more than I did 
before; though I approve of civil government, which provides that the true 
religion which is contained in the law of God, be not violated and polluted 
by public blasphemies with impunity. (Calvin 1536)
The Protestant distinction between the sphere of government and the sphere of religion
seemed to depend on the homogeneous or heterogeneous situation in which they found
themselves. More bluntly, it may have simply depended upon who held power.
18
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Most importantly, the Enlightenment period marked a return to democratic ideas.
John Locke, a British philosopher who bristled at the king’s claim to divine right, may be
the most influential philosopher from the period. Locke’s essay on religious tolerance
details a type of separation of church and state in which each individual would be
responsible for his own path to salvation; therefore, it was not the duty of the government
to enforce religious precepts on the people. Judging by Locke’s last several paragraphs,
however, there must be some role for the government, because he believes that Catholics
and atheists are not to be tolerated by any government. Locke wrote:
That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is 
constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby 
ipso facto deliver themselves up to the service and protection of another 
prince.. .Lastly, those are not to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. 
Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, 
can have no hold upon an atheist. (Locke 1689[1983])
In his Second Treatise on Government. Locke wrote extensively about the beginning and
nature of human society. He theorized that even in a state of nature in which no
government exists, there is a law, which is handed down by God and that God grants all
people with rights to life, liberty, and property. The purpose of the government is to
protect those God-given rights. (Locke 1689(1983]) Therefore the Enlightenment and
the Reformation gave birth to the idea of a separation of church and state, but the
separation was never meant to be a strict one, nor was the idea commonly practiced over
much of Europe.
This history and philosophy is directly reflected in the founding documents of the 
United States. Many of the colonial charters in the American colonies referred to a duty 
to God. For example, under a listing of capital laws in The Body of Liberties of the 
Massachusetts Colonie of New England, is written, “If any man after legal conviction
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shall have or worship any other god, but the lord god, he shall be put to death.” (1641)
The Declaration of Independence nearly quotes Locke’s natural rights philosophy as well
as referencing God in several sections. It ends, “And for the support of this Declaration,
with a firm reliance on the protection of the divine Providence, we mutually pledge to
each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.” (1776) After the states gained
independence and wrote their own Constitutions, many of them seemed to reflect the
separation of church and state suggested by the religious reformers, but with the same,
seemingly mixed message of partial support of religion by the government. The Virginia
Declaration of Rights states:
That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of 
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force 
or violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise 
of religion, according to the dictates of his own conscience; and that it is 
the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity 
towards each other. (1776)
This tradition of walking the fine line between government support of public morality in
the form of religion and allowing people the right to exercise religion freely has
obfuscated the standing case law in regards to participation in religious activity in school.
As A. James Reichley puts it
Historically, there is no doubt that religion played an important, perhaps 
indispensable, part in the development of democratic ideas and 
institutions, first in Europe and Âen in America. Some political theorists 
argue, however, that once these institutions are in place, they can be 
maintained on the basis of purely secular values. Others, supporting the 
beliefs of the Founders, contend that if values derived from religion are 
removed, the moral pillars on which democracy stands will crumble.
(1986)
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Education in America
The history of education in the United States presents a new challenge to the
separation of church and state. Originally, schools were church run, and the purpose of
education on the American continent was to prepare students for life in the religious
community. Much of this education focused on Bible reading and study, and higher
levels of education were created to prepare young boys for a future in becoming
ministers. (Boyers, et al 1996) Eva Brann writes.
With respect to the colleges, my main concern, there were no strictly 
private schools in this country in the early days. The colonial colleges 
were financed botii from public and private sources; sectarian and secular 
influences were thoroughly entangled with each other. (Brann 1979)
Initially, religion and education were inexorably tied, and the state intermingled funding
and land grants to these church sponsored institutions of learning. The Northwest
Ordinance solidified this role of the government in education by requiring that each new
state that joined the Union would be required to set aside a certain amount of land to the
support of public education. (Northwest Ordinance 1787)
Thomas Jefferson, who is often seen as a guiding philosopher in the area of
church and state, was also an advocate of publicly funded education for all citizens.
Jefferson developed an idea of schooling in which small communities would run and
fund conununity schools in which students would be prepared to serve the community.
Many aspects of his plan reflected the classical republican philosophies of the early
Greeks. Even Jefferson, who is famous for his Deist perspective and attempt to remove
all superstitious and supernatural references from the Bible, recognized the need to allow
religious practice in the public schools. In an 1825 letter to Arthur Spicer
Brockenborough, Jefferson wrote:
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In the Rockfish report it was stated as probable that a building larger than 
the Pavilions might be called for in time, in which might be rooms for a 
library, for public examinations, and for religious worship under such 
impartial regulations as the Visitors should prescribe, the legislature 
neither sanctioned nor rejected this proposition; and afterwards, in the 
Report of Oct 1822. the board suggested, as a substitute, that the different 
religious sects should be invited to establish their separate theological 
schools in the vicinity of the University, in which the Students might 
attend religious worship, each in the form of his respective sect, and thus 
avoid all jealousy of attempts on his religious tenets, among the 
enactments of the board is one looking to this object, and superseding the 
first idea of permitting a room in the Rotunda to be used for religious 
worship, and of undertaking to frame a set of regulations of equality and 
impartiality among the multiplied sects. I state these things as manifesting 
the caution which the board of Visitors thinks it a duty to observe on this 
delicate and jealous subject, your proposition therefore leading to an 
application of the University buildings to other than University purposes, 
and to a partial regulation in favor of two particular sects, would be a 
deviation from the course which they think it their duty to observe..
(Jefferson [1825] 1983)
Though Jefferson did go on to suggest that it might be easier for students to attend
churches in a nearby community, he did not indicate any disapproval of the board’s
suggestions regarding ftie provision of a building for religious worship on the
University’s grounds, and seemed to support the idea that the problem with his friend’s
plan was the support of specific sects. This would support the accomodationist view that
government could support religious practice in general while not granting special
privileges to certain sects.
As the nation expanded and the government took on more roles, states began to
provide public education for all students. Many of these states developed compulsory
attendance laws that forced students to attend school between certain ages. The demands
of the Industrial Revolution and of the increasing complexity of American public life
required that the youth in America be provided with compulsory education in order to be
effective citizens. (Arends 1998) Schools never entirely separated themselves from
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their history of religious instruction. Until the 1960s, most states maintained traditions of 
prayer in school and devotional Bible reading. Many of these activities went 
unchallenged in the United States, because the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment applied only to the federal government, but the case of Everson v. Board o f 
Education (330 U.S.l) changed that and incorporated the clause into the fundamental 
liberties covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The sheer 
weight of amicus curiae briefs filed by other states in support of New York in the case of 
Engel V. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) and in support of the state of Maryland in the case of 
Abington School District v. Schempp (474 U.S. 203) prove the fact that many states had 
retained tradition carried over fi-om the religious foundations of education in the U.S.
Intent of the Framers 
Legal scholars who interpret the Constitution by seeking the intent of the original 
writers of key clauses and sections search legal record for the true meaning of the 
Establishment Clause in relation to the problem of school prayer. (Scalia 1998) This type 
of interpretation allows a consistent set of beliefs about the fundamental principles of the 
American government. An interpretation of this type could provide clear case law which 
might stand the test of time, leading to a more consistent set of laws within the United 
States. Seeking the intent of the Framers can be an arduous process, however, and may 
be fraught with a new set of interpretations. Even experts in Framers’ intent can disagree 
on the final definition of a provision in light of the historical record. Furthermore, many 
of the Framers disagreed amongst themselves, and this type of interpretation often relies 
on the journals and notes of one or two key Framers, such as James Madison. (Levy
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1986) As Justice David Souter notes in his concurrence on Lee v. Weisman (505 U.S. 
577), “the Framers simply did not share an understanding of the Establishment Clause.” 
Newer amendments are interpreted through the scope of congressional debate records, 
but those records may not reflect the full range of discussion and disagreement that 
occurred over the provision’s meaning.
Interpreters who use this method to define the Establishment Clause often rely on 
the writing and history of James Madison and of the First Congress. For the scholar, the 
natural starting point is the purpose of the provision, or in this case, the purpose of the 
Bill of Rights itself, a compromise made between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists 
in order to secure the ratification of the Constitution. (Center for Civic Education 2000) 
The Anti-Federalists had many concerns regarding the new government, and their most 
significant concern was that the right of the states to rule within their own spheres was 
going to be usurped by a newly empowered national government. (Ketcham 1986) 
Among their greatest fears was the idea that the national government could infiinge on 
the rights of the people, rights protected by the individual state constitutions.
James Madison, ideological leader of the Federalist movement, was initially 
reluctant to include religious protections in the list of liberties that would be guaranteed 
by the federal government. It was not that he expected the national government to allow 
religious persecution, but he did not wish to list rights over which the federal government 
had no initial power. At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison is quoted as 
remarking, “There is not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with 
religion. Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation.” Both 
Madison and the Anti-Federalists agreed that religion was a matter that was strictly under
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State control, but the Anti-Federalists insisted that the same protections for religion that 
existed on a state level should be applied to the federal government.
Madison modeled the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment after similar 
clauses in many state constitutions, including the clause in the Virginia constitution that 
Madison encouraged Mason to include. (Center for Civic Education 2000) Maryland’s 
official interpretation of non-establishment meant that all Christian churches were to have 
equal access to state funding. (Maryland Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights)
The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 reads, “That there shall be no establishment of any 
one sect in this Province, in preference to another,” but in the next sentence grants special 
privileges to Protestant. From these, Madison developed a clause which simply read, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” (United States 
Constitution) This wording is clearly broader and more tolerant of non-Christian sects 
than the state constitutions were, but the basic meaning was the same: Congress was not 
to support a religion.
Madison was a Deist and feared excessive intermingling of church and state. A 
1774 letter to William Bradford detailed Madison’s fear of an overly powerful religious 
sect taking over government functions as he detailed persecution of religious dissenters in 
his own community. He wrote, “That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution 
rages among some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their Quota of Imps 
for such business. This vexes me the most of any thing whatever. There are at this in the 
adjacent County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in close for publishing their 
religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox.” (Madison 1774) Evidence 
suggests that Madison’s view of the clause he penned may be more narrow than many
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have assumed. Madison is quoted in the Congressional record as stating that “he 
apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion 
and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship in any manner 
contrary to their own conscience.” (Annals I: 729-731) Further proof that Madison did 
not intend to prohibit all forms of government support for religious practice comes from 
Madison’s presidency. During the War of 1812, Madison declared a national day of 
prayer and fasting. (Madison 1814)
The First Congress also left some key as to what the Establishment Clause meant. 
In its debate over the clause, the wording was clarified so as to restrict only the federal 
government and not to infiinge on the states’ right to adopt their own religious 
protections. Many of the congressmen feared that the amendment would be too harmfiil 
of religion and would restrict the relationship between religion and state too narrowly. 
(Annals 1:729-731) That debate took place, as all others since the founding of Congress, 
after a prayer led by a chaplain paid by federal funds. This Congress also approved both 
a national day of prayer and thanksgiving and direct financial support to privately run 
schools that were still in the practice of teaching religious principles. (Center for Civic 
Education)
Thomas Jefferson’s role as Secretary of State did not give him much of a voice in
the process of proposing or ratifying the amendment, but Jefferson is often quoted in
Court decisions restricting governments involvement with religion. The most quoted
phrase, “Wall of Separation” comes from a letter he wrote to a Baptist committee in
1801. Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man 
and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
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worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and 
not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should "make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between church and 
State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in 
behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the 
progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural 
rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
In this context, he seems to be referring to the fact that government cannot infringe on a
citizen’s right to believe as he chooses. Jefferson acknowledges the importance of the
moral values that religion carries with it in regards to the education of youth. In his
second inaugural address, he was clear as to where power over religion lay.
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is placed by 
the constitution independent of the powers of the general government. I 
have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the religious 
exercises suited to it; but have left them, as the constitution found them, 
under the direction and discipline of state or church authorities 
acknowledged by the several religious societies. (1805)
Evidence as to the intent of the Framers with regard to the meaning of the
Establishment Clause would lead one to the conclusion that religious matters were to be
left mainly to the state. This is complicated by the Fourteenth Amendment and the
incorporation doctrine spawned by the Court in the early twentieth century.
Interpretation of the Establishment Clause in light of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment revokes this power from the state governments. {Everson v.
Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1) However, several justices have argued that a more
historical interpretation of the First Amendment allows the states the right to
ceremonially use prayer in school facilities. Footnotes 1,2, and 3 of Justice Stewart’s
dissent in Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) detail the many instances in which the federal
government has ceremonially made reference to God in official public speeches or
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activities. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Wallace v. Jqffree (472 U.S. 38), 
called modem interpretation of the Establishment Clause a misreading of the history.
This record would seem to indicate that the intent of the Framers was not to restrict state 
sponsored schools from offering an opening prayer which was neither coercive nor 
denominational.
One cannot necessarily rely, however, on the intent of the Framers as sound 
constitutional interpretation. The Congress that framed the Fourteenth Amendment also 
passed an ordinance forcing Washington, D.C.’s public schools to be racially segregated. 
{Brown v. Board o f Education 347 U.S. 483 1954) Few would argue today, however, 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause allows the segregation of 
public schools in the United States. Those who believe that the Constitution should adapt 
to changing times and mores cite Brown and other civil rights cases as examples of the 
Constitution not only adapting, but fulfilling the promise of its provisions.
Literal Interpretation
Scholars of literal interpretation seek to divine the meaning of a constitutional 
provision by interpreting word usage and placement. Proponents of this method claim 
that it will maintain the integrity of the Constitution as a guiding document as it allows 
for a consistent and clear reading of constitutional provisions. Opponents claim that 
changing nuisances in word usage confound the method and that experts will continue to 
disagree over the importance of word placement and word choice. This method allows 
little adaptation of the Constitution to modem problems and relies on the same limited 
historical record on which the intent of the Framers rests. (Scalia 1998)
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As far as interpretation of the Establishment Clause is concerned, one would have 
to look at the very specific usage of the words. First of all, Congress is specified as the 
institution which may not make a law respecting an establishment of religion. This 
would restrict the usage of the clause to the federal government only, but this 
interpretation would have to be modified in order to account for the effects of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation doctrine. {Everson v. board o f Education 
330 U.S. 1)
Secondly, one would have to study the wording. It seems as if all sides agree that 
the Establishment Clause restricts the federal government fium setting up a mandated 
state church the way the English king had established the Church of England. There is, 
however, debate over the definition of the word “establishment.” In the Framers’ time, 
establishment may have meant simply that a government was setting up an official 
religious practice, but the Court has defiued Establishment by three criteria: non-secular 
purpose, advancing or inhibiting religion, and the excessive entanglement of government 
with religion. {Lemon v. Kurtzman 401 U.S. 192) This definition has caused a great deal 
of confusion over the definition of a secular purpose. (Van Alstyne 1963) Most of the 
debate has been limited to cases involving state fimding of parochial schools; however, 
the Lemon test has become the standard measure by which all school prayer cases are 
measured as well. Incidentally, it is the secular purpose test on which school prayer 
activities fail the test.
There is also confusion as to the definition of religion. Writing in 1951, Lynford 
Lardner asserts that
If we assume that the Framers of the First Amendment used words
carefidly, it is easy to see that the Amendment might well mean more than
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just a prohibition of a national church in the British sense. A law 
respecting an establishment of religion has more comprehensive 
connotations than a law respecting the establishment of a church.
In 1963, William Carroll suggested that the only definition of the word religion would
have to be one which acknowledges the rights of non-believers with the same respect as
those of believers. These varying definitions of even the word religion can cause
problems as school and districts, feeling pressed by their constituencies, seek to find a
form of prayer that does not further religion.
The literal interpretation of the Establishment Clause, in its narrowest sense,
would seem to support state sponsored prayer in school, although it might prohibit
nationally sponsored prayer in school. Of course the Fourteenth Amendment and
Everson have, at least, complicated that part of the literal interpreter’s argument. There is
too much difficulty in this form of interpretation to say with any certainty the extent to
which the clause is applicable to the states as well as the extent to which it protects any
religious activity fi'om state intermingling. Different people involved in the
congressional debates may even have had different definitions of the words in question.
Also, placing special emphasis on specific words, such as “respecting” or “an”, can
change the literal meaning of clause. Some interpreters even grant special significance to
the absence of the word “a” before the word religion. (Levy 1986) Therefore, a justice
with a sharp mind could use a literal interpretation either to strike down or to defend
school prayer.
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Evolutionary Interpretation 
The most common modem method of interpretation is the evolutionary method. 
This allows a justice to broadly apply constitutional principles and concepts to the 
changing needs of a changing society. It allows the constitution to bend and mold itself 
to modem times without the lengthy and arduous process of constitutional amendment 
and permits justices to apply their own morality and sense of faimess to constitutional 
doctrine. Many scholars label this method “judicial activism,” which is a derogatory 
term in the legal realm, and some complain of the lack of consistent precedent that is 
spawned by the evolutionary approach. As difficult as it may be to scour the historical 
record to discover the meanings of the past, it is more difficult to peer into a proverbial 
crystal ball to discover the needs of the future. (Scalia 1998)
Justices usually try to confine themselves within accepted traditional principles of 
constitutional government when interpreting the Constitution in this way. One of the key 
concepts in relation to prayer in school is that of popular sovereignty, or mle by the will 
of the people. Public opinion concerning school prayer has shown a consistent and 
overwhelming majority in favor of non-denominational prayer in public school. (Green 
and Guth 1989; Jacoby 1990; Servin- Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999) In recognition 
of public opinion, the Republican Party maintains a platform plank calling for an 
amendment to allow non-denominational non-coercive prayer in public school. (Janda 
1999) The amicus briefs filed to support states in each of the prayer cases can be 
accepted as examples of popular support of school prayer. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421, 
Wallace v. Jqffree 472 U.S. 38) Many states, such as Nevada, have passed silent
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contemplation statutes that avoid the ruling in Jqffree by not making any mention of 
prayer.
Another of the main doctrines of the American political system is that of 
federalism, each state maintains certain powers that are not under the control of the 
federal government. The Tenth Amendment states that “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the 
states respectively or to the people.” (United States Constitution) Judging by the claims 
of Madison at the Virginia Ratifying Convention that the federal government had no hint 
of power over religion, one might conclude that these powers would be left to the states 
and to the people. Education, since becoming a public instead of private function, has 
always been a state function (Arends 1998), and states are allowed to set their own moral 
standards in other cases. {Miller v. California 418 U.S. 915) Therefore, one might 
conclude that community standards should be the guiding principle in the matter of 
school prayer. (Peterson 1963)
The interpretation of die Fourteenth Amendment as apply the Establishment 
Clause to the states {Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1) complicated the 
relationship between the state governments and the Establishment Clause. The 
Fourteenth Amendment was constructed in order to protect the rights of people from the 
abusive powers of state governments. In Everson, the Court identified the right to 
protection against the establishment of religion to be one of the fundamental rights to be 
protected under the umbrella of the Fourteenth. This decision precluded states from 
setting their own standards in regard to the establishment of religion and forced states to
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adapt to the national definition of the Establishment Clause, as defined by the United 
States Supreme Court.
The general purpose of the First Amendment in total seems to be to protect 
freedom of expression of ideas and beliefs. The Court has recognized this as a concern in 
the case of Westside Community Board o f Education v. Mergens (496 U.S. 226). In order 
to achieve Mill’s ideal of the marketplace of ideas, freedom of expression must be 
protected in all places and in regards to all different forms of expression. (Mill 1982) 
Students’ rights to express themselves do not disintegrate when school is in session 
(Tinker v. Des Moines School District 393 U.S.503), but students do face stricter 
restrictions on speech protections than do adults in public places. (Bethel School District 
Number 403 v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675) This protection of the freedom of expression might 
support a non-coercive school prayer if it was deemed to be an expression of the 
students’ beliefs and not of the state’s, but the Supreme Court has also denied that this 
type of expression is protected when school equipment is used for the dissemination of 
the religious message and the school is aware that the student might express a religious 
sentiment. (Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 530 U.S. 290)
Madison believed that the greatest protection against religious persecution would 
come from the diversity of belief within a nation as large and populated as the United 
States. (Virginia Ratifying Convention 1787) This largely agreed with his view of 
factions as expressed in Federalist 10. The protection of diversity, the respect to minority 
rights, and the tolerance of religious factions are all basic parts of the American 
foundation of government. The Establishment Clause gives American citizens a freedom 
from religion. The Constitution denies the right of the government to establish a
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religious test for any public office. (United States Constitution Article VI) According to 
some, any law concerning religion in the Untied States should consider the rights of non­
believers as equal with the rights of believers and allow non-believers to follow their own 
conscience without coercion, subtle or otherwise. (Carroll 1963) These principles may 
conflict witii the establishment of a state-written prayer, even if it is non-denominational.
Lastly, the Constitution was written to limit the scope of government. It is a 
social contract by the definition of John Locke, meant to protect people from the 
government. (Wooten 1983) Under this definition, the government exists to protect life, 
liberty, and property; it has no right to direct citizens to the proper use of any of those 
rights unless they are in conflict with the rights of another. Since the reformation, 
religion has been widely viewed as a private matter between the worshipper and his or 
her God. Protestants are directed to read and interpret biblical scriptures for themselves, 
and many sects believe in a personal path to salvation. (Ellis, E. and Esler, A. 1999) 
Under this interpretation, state sponsored school prayer would probably not be 
constitutional.
This type of interpretation leads to muddled and confiising policy. It may lead a 
judge to decide that it is up to each individual community to decide and define prayer 
statutes for itself. It may lead him to encourage school districts to write a prayer that 
recognizes all religious traditions, including atheism, equally, a nearly impossible task. A 
judge may require that the people in a state strip religion from their moral codes and 
teach tiiem from a secular perspective, another daunting task. Evolutionary interpretation 
seems to be the type used in the case of Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) and on which, by 
the doctrine of stare decisis, all subsequent prayer cases have rested.
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Conclusion
Establishment Clause interpretation is notoriously difficult and inconsistent. 
Religious practices involving school have enjoyed the support of the state and the Court 
as long as the state acted neutrally, not showing favor to any sect, and as long as the 
people participating had the right to choose their level of participation in the activity.
This is true of state funded busing to private school (Everson v. Board o f Education 330 
U.S. 1), release time for students studying religion during the school day (Zorach v. 
Clauson 343 U.S. 306), Bible club meetings on school campus (Westside Community 
Board o f Education v. Mergens 496 U.S. 226), public school teachers providing 
assistance to student with special needs in parochial schools (Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 
203), and direct public payments to parochial schools for the education of at-risk 
students. (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639) Somehow, however, the same logic 
of neutrality and choice does not apply to non-denominational, non-coercive prayer 
(Engel V. Vitale 370 U.S. 421), moments of silence for prayer (Wallace v. Jaffree 472 
U.S. 38), or prayer at extra-curricular activities. (Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
DOE 530 U.S. 290) In these cases, the Courts have asked that the state be decidedly anti­
religion. With regard to prayer, the Supreme Court has allowed public sponsorship of 
prayer as a means of ceremonial recognition of God. Footnotes in Engel v. Vitale 
reference the congressional use of chaplains, the crier’s introduction of the Supreme 
Court, presidential proclamations of days of prayer and fasting, the national motto “In 
God We Trust” on all U.S. currency, and the addition of the words “under God” to the 
Pledge of Allegiance. This ceremonial usage, however, does not protect ceremonial 
prayer at the beginning of the school day (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421), ceremonial
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invocations and benedictions at public school graduation ceremonies (Lee v. Weisman 
505 U.S 577), or ceremonial prayer to begin a football game. (Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. DOE 530 U.S. 290)
In the United States, there has always been a tangled relationship between religion 
and state, especially in regards to the education of children. There is a precarious balance 
between the protection of people from religious indoctrination and persecution and 
protecting the public morality. Religion has always been recognized as an important 
piece of the foundation for democracy, from the writings of the classical republicans 
(Plato The Republic Book III) to the observations of Tocqueville (Tocqueville 
Democracv in America Volume 1 Part 2 Chapter 9) to the studies of modem political 
scientists. (Reichley 1986) Prayer in school has been a major battlefield for the balancing 
of rights of the individual and protection of the common good, and the war of lawsuits, 
proposed amendments, and state insubordination continues. (Elifson and Hadaway 1985) 
For the Court, the challenge is to create a definition of the Establishment Clause that is 
consistent, that protects the free exercise of the religious people of the nation, that 
protects the fi’eedom fi'om religion for non-believers, and that satisfies public opinion in 
order to preserve democracy.
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CHAPTERS
ENGEL V. VITALE 
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy 
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 
421) These simple words, spoken by school children in the State of New York at the 
beginning of their school day in 1962 would set off one of the most controversial cases in 
recent history. The regents in New York developed the prayer as part of a program that 
would improve moral and spiritual training in the public schools. It was the purpose of 
this prayer, not simply the wording, that caused some parents to immediately object to 
what they perceived as the Christian indoctrination of their children and as a direct 
violation of the First Amendment. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
Although the New York Court of Appeals forced schools in New York to allow 
students to remain silent or to leave the room witiiout any comment from the teacher, the 
parents were unsatisfied. They appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States for 
redress of their grievances uncovering, on a national level, the controversy that had been 
brewing in many of the states. (Way 1985) Certainly, they argued, the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment should protect people of marginal religious faiths from 
encroachment by the majority. When the Supreme Court agreed, school districts across 
the nation scrambled to find some way around the decision and the public cried foul. 
(Elifson and Hadaway 1985,Servin-Gonzalez and Torres Reyna 1999)
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The problem with the Engel decision may not have been one of proper reading of 
the Constitution, though previously decided establishment precedent, if closely followed, 
may have led to a different conclusion. {Everson v. Board o f Education o f Ewing 
Township 330 U.S. 1, Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306) In his decision. Black attempted 
to divorce the tradition of the United States from its state practices while using aspects of 
American history to deride even cursory state support of religion and ignoring the 
positive interplay between government and religion that has characterized the United 
States. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) It might have been this divorcement of America 
from its traditions in the case of schooling that lead to the greatest portion of the public 
outcry.
Overall, the issue of whether of not prayer is permissible in public school did not 
begin or end with the Engel decision. The divisiveness of the issue stretches back into 
the early twentieth century; however, the split within the Court to some degree mirrored 
the split within the nation, and the case nationalized the issue of public prayer. Justice 
Black, while expanding the protections of the Establishment Clause, shed little light on 
proper interpretation of the clause, which led to further cases as states and school districts 
maneuvered around the decision.
Public Opinion and Federalism 
One of the key principles of the Supreme Court is that it is designed to be 
apolitical, free from the pressures of public opinion and from the forces that often control 
other branches. It is not surprising, then, that the Court occasionally makes decisions that 
are severely out of step with public passions. Such was the case with the Engel decision.
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Usually, over several years, the societal norms shift to align themselves with judicial 
doctrine, as in the case of school desegregation. (Wilson 2002) This did not happen in 
the Engel case, as public opinion in favor of non-denominational prayer in school has 
only narrowly declined in the twenty years since the decision has been enforced. ( Elifson 
and Hadaway 1985, Servin-Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999)
The sheer weight of public opinion is evident in the number and types of amicus 
curiae briefs filed in relation to the case. Twenty-two different states filed amid in 
support of the right of the state of New York to continue these prayers. It is obvious that 
these twenty-two states would be directly affected by the decisions, since they would 
have to amend their moral education codes as well. Filing amicus against the prayer were 
an ethical union and two Jewish Councils. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) The Jewish 
population of the United States is admittedly smaller than the Christian population and 
has always been part of a type of marginal religious group, but this case should not be 
interpreted as a problem of Christians against Jews, since the Court acknowledged that 
some respondents professed no particular religion.
According to Justice Black’s decision in Everson v. Board o f Education, states are 
meant to be neutral in the treatment of religion. He writes, “That Amendment requires 
the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non­
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be 
used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.” (330 U.S. 1) Modem analysis 
has shown, however, that the Court has tended to favor marginal religious practices over 
those of the majority population. This was not common prior to the decision in Engel,
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however, it was common after the judicial religious revolution of which Engel was the
beginning. Way and Burt wrote,
In our study of litigation from 1946 through 1956 when marginal religious 
claimants sought exemptions from social norms that conflicted with their 
religious beliefs and strict codes of behavior, the judiciary was generally 
not receptive...the percentages of successfiil claims increased dramatically 
during the period from 1970 to 1980. (1983)
Although this research deals most directly with the Free Exercise Clause, it is applicable
here for the fact that persons belonging to marginal faiths or professing no faith were
challenging an established traditional practice within the public school system, and the
Court ended up ruling in favor of these litigants. It is arguable also, that the free exercise
of the majority faith was curtailed by the decision to end school prayer, as those litigants
were no longer able to reap full enjoyment of their own religious practices, even after the
state made many clear attempts to remain neutral by composing a prayer that was non-
denominational and by allowing exemptions for those whose parents did not wish them to
participate.
Again, this issue did not arise from nothingness beginning with the Engel case,
but prior to the decision in Everson, each state was left to make its own rules regarding
religious establishment according to its own constitution. Some states even struck the
practice prior to the Engel decision, but most states in which it was challenged agreed
that public school prayer did not constitute direct state support of religion. Way writes.
Prior to Engel/Schempp, sixteen states upheld prayer and Bible reading, 
generally in single decisions which were never overturned or adjusted.
Similarly, five states ruled against prayers and/or Bible reading in single 
decisions which, again, were never overturned or modified. Two 
additional states, while upholding the constitutionality of prayer and Bible 
reading, required that schools institute an excuse system for students who 
did not wish to participate on the grounds of religious belief. (1985)
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Fully eighteen state courts, when challenged, upheld the right of states and school 
districts to create prayers for use in the public schools as part of a moral or character 
education based on the fact that history and tradition folly supported the practice. This 
reinforces the importance, prior to Engel, of the history and traditional alignment of 
prayer and public schooling.
Several factors contribute to the controversial nature of this case. First, the 
decision was in direct opposition to prevailing public opinion on the issue. (Elifson and 
Hadaway 1985, Servin-Gonzale and Torres-Reyna 1999) The fact that three of the seven 
justices who sat on the case wrote separate opinions signals the degree of the depth of 
disagreement in the United States over the issue of school prayer. Second, some 
interpreted the decision as the Court to place the Establishment Clause to place the Free 
Exercise rights of marginal religions above those of the majority. (Way and Burt 1983) 
Third, it exempted public schools from enjoyment of a religious practice which is 
acceptable in other public spheres. Last, and most importantly, it shifted accepted 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause from that practiced by the states (Way 1985) 
and from that made law by the Everson decision.
History
Justice Black began his decision in Engel with a long history of the establishment 
of religion from colonial settlement until the passage of the First Amendment, a feat he 
repeated from his decision in Everson. {Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1, Engel 
V. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) Although he recognized the early interplay of religion and 
community life, he dismissed the need for continuing religious interference in education.
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Black invoked the names of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison as proponents of a 
strict separation of church and state, but he ignores the interplay of religion and public 
goals even within the writings of these two Founders. Last, he used the history of 
religious establishment to justify the interpretation of the Establishment Clause that 
would allow him to remove even non-denominational, non-coercive prayer from schools, 
but research into the passage and meaning of the clause implies another answer might be 
possible.
The history of establishment in Europe is most definitely one of violent 
persecution. Black used this backdrop to describe the excesses of religious establishment 
that can start with something as simple as state support of a non-denominational prayer. 
He wrote, “It is a matter of history that this very practice of establishing govemmentally 
composed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which caused many of our 
early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America.” Early colonial 
experience, he described, was fraught with religious persecution of minority faiths, 
prompting, at least by the late eighteenth century, but earlier in some colonies, the 
passage of a string of religious toleration laws in the early states. James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson led the charge in Virginia, with Madison making significant effort to 
tame the wording of the Virginia Bill of Rights.
What Black ignored when he invoked both Jefferson and Madison is the religious 
nature of many of their writings. Neither, of course, was in favor of establishing specific 
churches for any state in the Union nor of forcing support of any religion by tax monies. 
However, Jefferson and Madison are far from irreligious, and there was not a strict 
separation, for these two, between religious virtues and secular, democratic virtues. Both
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recognized the large role that religion played in the development of the American ideal 
(Reichley 1986), although Madison especially feared the power of overbearing religious 
majorities. (Lindsay 1991)
Thomas Jefferson, often wrongly believed to be the original source of the wall of 
separation metaphor, often wrote with a religious overtone. The Declaration of 
Independence of 1776 makes several references to a Creator. Jefferson, in a letter to Dr. 
Thomas Cooper in 1822, relayed his recommendation that the University of Virginia 
invite all sects to establish theology professorships for the training of young men. In 
addition, he thought that the theological discussion that would take place in such close 
quarters would lead to greater cooperation and peace between competing sects.
(Jefferson [1822] 1984) His disagreement was with education controlled by a specific 
sect.
In Everson, Black focused on Jefferson’s authorship of the Act Establishing
Religious Freedom in Virginia in 1785. (330 U.S. 1) Black considered this bill to be the
furthest reaching of the early religious freedom bills and purported to support Jefferson’s
principles. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) However, Jefferson began this Bill with the
words “Almighty God.” The thrust of Black’s argument; however, seemed to rest on a
passage removing public financial support from any religious function.
that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation 
of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the 
forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, 
is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to 
the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose 
powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness, and is withdrawing from 
the ministry those temporary rewards, which proceeding from an 
approbation of their personal conduct, are an additional incitement to 
earnest and unremitting labours for the instruction of mankind; Virginia,
Act Establishing Religious Freedom 1785)
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In order for this argument to apply successfully in the case of Engel v. Vitale, one would
first have to equate the salary of the teacher who is leading the prayer with a financial
support of said prayer. As Justice William O. Douglas clarified in his concurrence.
In New York the teacher who leads in prayer is on the public payroll; and 
the time she takes seems minuscule as compared with the salaries 
appropriated by state legislatures and Congress for chaplains to conduct 
prayers in the legislative halls. Only a bare fraction of the teacher's time is 
given to reciting this short 22-word prayer, about the same amount of time 
that our Crier spends announcing the opening of our sessions and offering 
a prayer for this Court. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 430)
For Douglas, as for many Americans, it was difficult to see the prayer as an
unconstitutional financial support of religion. Douglas also stated that all semblance of
coercion had been removed from the practice, except the coercion of teachers, of which
no one was complaining. Therefore, Black’s argument that he is following Jefferson’s
principles does not seem to hold up to historical analysis, since there was no coercion.
James Madison was also rather prolific in his writing concerning religious values
and the role of the state, and more importantly, he is generally deemed the author of the
First Amendment. Madison, though considered hostile toward religion by some (Lindsay
1991), often spoke of a duty to a creator. Even while arguing against a bill that would
provide direct state aid to Christian teachers, Madison exhorted the importance of
religion in the lives of the American people. He even directly quoted a previous
statement attributed to himself by saying, “Because we hold it for a fundamental and
undeniable truth, ‘that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence.’" (Madison 1785) Madison believed that no man should be coerced into
supporting any religious belief.
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Again, beginning with Douglas’ argument, one can see why Madison’s principle
is not necessarily in conflict with the Regents’ prayer in New York. Douglas wrote.
No student, however, is compelled to take part. The respondents have 
adopted a regulation which provides that "Neither teachers nor any school 
authority shall comment on participation or non-participation. . .  nor 
suggest or request that any posture or language be used or dress be worn 
or be not used or not worn." Provision is also made for excusing children, 
upon written request of a parent or guardian, from the saying of the prayer 
or from the room in which the prayer is said. A letter implementing and 
explaining this regulation has been sent to each taxpayer and parent in the 
school district. As I read this regulation, a child is free to stand or not 
stand, to recite or not recite, without fear of reprisal or even comment by 
the teacher or any other school official. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
So, under the exemption plan as devised by the New York State Court of Appeals, no
child was being coerced to support any religious beliefs. Second, both Black and
Douglas concede the non-denominational nature of the prayer, meaning that the Regent’s
prayer imparted no specific religious belief, according to the Court. The problem instead
seemed to be the format of the prayer, out of sync with Jewish tradition, and the fact that
it supported religion in general, which may have offended those who professed no
religion. Last, the spirit of the prayer was in the tradition of the ceremonial recognition of
God, a tradition to which Madison was not immune. In footnote 3 of his dissent. Justice
Stewart quoted Madison as saying, during the term of his presidency,
"But the source to which I look. . .  is i n . . .  my fellow-citizens, and in the 
counsels of those representing them in the other departments associated in the 
care of the national interests. In these my confidence vdll under every difficulty 
be best placed, next to that which we have all been encouraged to feel in the 
guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power regulates the 
destiny of nations, whose blessings have been so conspicuously dispensed to this 
rising Republic, and to whom we are bound to address our devout gratitude for 
the past, as well as our fervent supplications and best hopes for the future." {Engel 
V . Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
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Even Thomas Lindsay, who believed that Madison was hostile to religion concluded that
Madison would not support the dissolution of a law based on that law’s support of
general religious morality over the rights of marginal religions to freely exercise. (1991)
Black attempted to use this historical argument to provide a sound basis for his
view of the purpose of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment made applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. He wrote
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not 
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is 
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion 
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or 
not. This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a 
particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such 
individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of 
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect 
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing 
officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes underlying the 
Establishment Clause go much fiirther than that. Its first and most 
immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and 
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. (Engel v.
Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
In this way he made an argument that is broader in its stroke than either Jefferson’s or 
Madison’s. Black did not reference, however, the historical data that would argue that 
the purpose of the Establishment Clause is much more narrow than he would assume.
The First Congress authorized many outlays of public monies to assist schools, at a time 
when most schooling was done in religious institutions. They also authorized a chaplain 
who would lead daily prayer in the chambers of Congress. Although Black recognized 
the chaplaincy in Congress as an acceptable form of public prayer, which is not only 
often denominational in nature and somewhat coercive on the members of Congress, he 
separated this historical authorization of public support of prayer from the authorization 
of prayer in public schools. (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
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Justice Black’s reliance on the historical record to prove the dangers of 
establishment are very convincing to the extent that they concern direct establishment of 
specific religious beliefs by the federal government, but they are less convincing to 
accomodationists in the case of a non-denominational, non-coercive school prayer 
established by a state government. The state of New York made no attempt to establish a 
particular religious belief and to coerce young students into blindly accepting such, the 
way a European nation of the Middle Ages might have done. Jefferson and Madison, 
who were vehemently opposed to this type of establishment as well as other direct state 
support of specific religious principles, both seem to recognize the importance of 
traditional morality and virtue in the schooling process. Furthermore, Black’s 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause seems to be more sweeping than even his 
previous interpretation in Everson. In his concurrence, Douglas conceded the historical 
argument to the acomodationists, saying, “I cannot say that to authorize this prayer is to 
establish a religion in the strictly historic meaning of those words. A religion is not 
established in the usual sense merely by letting those who choose to do so say the prayer 
that the public school teacher leads.” {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
Tradition
The most prevalent argument in the concurrence and dissent of Engel is that of 
tradition. Black grazed by this argument, relegating it to a foomote, but the sheer weight 
of public outcry may be based in large part on the long-standing tradition in the United 
States of marking important activities with an invocation of God. In fact, more recent 
cases involving school prayer have centered themselves around this traditional aspect in
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asking the Court to consider prayer at graduation {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) and 
even student led prayer to begin a football game. (Santa Fe Independent School District 
V. Doe 530 U.S. 290)
There are in fact two parts to the argument that traditional features of American 
government would support a non-denominational prayer at the beginning of the school 
day. First, there is a traditional link between secular and religious education that began 
with the first schools in the United States. Second is the fact that public prayer is 
recognized as proper in many different publicly supported forums besides that of school. 
Justice Stewart’s dissent in Engel rested almost entirely on the second feature. (370 U.S. 
421)
The first institutions of learning in the United States arose in order to train clergy
and were later expanded to training in other fields of academia without losing their
fundamentally religious flair or church fimding. Justice Douglas noted in footnote 9 that
Religion was once deemed to be a function of the public school system.
The Northwest Ordinance, which antedated the First Amendment, 
provided in Article III that "Religion, morality, and knowledge being 
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and 
the means of education shall forever be encouraged.” (Engel v. Vitale 370 
U.S. 421)
Douglas, does not concede, however, that this is a valid reason to continue the 
entanglement of government and religion in the area of education. The justices made no 
attempt to explain why 1962 was the appropriate year to cut the vine of religion fi"om the 
tree of learning. One must assume that no one had ever challenged a similar practice at 
the Supreme Court level prior to that year.
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School is the place in which students leam to become part of the American
society, not only through rote and tests, but also through the practice of American values
and ceremonial rituals. Justice Black claimed
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent 
with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to 
express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the 
Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by 
singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's 
professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are 
many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or 
ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned 
religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this 
instance. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
As difficult as it is for the common reader to understand the difference between the non-
denominational prayer and the reference to God in more patriotic pieces, it has also
become increasingly difficult to separate these two in the long wake of the Engel
decision. In 2002, a father in the state of California claimed Establishment Clause
violation by the Congress when it added the words “imder God” to the Pledge of
Allegiance in 1953 as a means to enhance patriotism during the Cold War. To much
public dismay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
parent, using the Lee decision as a guide. (Newdow v. United States Congress 00-16423)
The United States Supreme Court stayed the lower court decision and eventually
overturned the decision based on a standing issue. {Elk Grove Independent School
District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 12-1624) The three minority opinions issued in Newdow
dealt with the merits, however. One, Justice Clarence Thomas’, traced the evolution of
Establishment Clause interpretation directly through the decision by the Ninth Circuit,
claiming that the Ninth Circuit made their decision fully aligned with a flawed precedent
that dated back to Everson.
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Considering that there is a direct connection between the decision in Lee and the
precedent o î Engel it seems as if Black’s fear of a slippery slope of establishment, that
allowing the state to write a non-denominational prayer would lead to further state
encroachments of religion, has worked in the opposite direction since the publication of
the Engel decision. As Court of Appeals Judge O’Scanlain pointed out in dissent to the
denial of an order presented in Newdow, “Such an assertion would make hypocrites out
of the founders and would have the effect of driving any and all references to our
religious heritage out of our schools, and eventually out of our public life.” {Newdow v.
United States Congress 00-16423)
American public life is intertwined with religious practice and tradition. Justice
Douglas detailed a list of just some of the pervasive aspects of religion in public life in
foomote 1 of his concurrence. Quoting David Fellman, he stated,
"There are many aids' to religion in this country at all levels of 
government. To mention but a few at the federal level, one might begin by 
observing that the very First Congress which wrote the First Amendment 
provided for chaplains in both Houses and in the armed services. There is 
compulsory chapel at the service academies, and religious services are 
held in federal hospitals and prisons. The President issues religious 
proclamations. The Bible is used for the administration of oaths. N. Y. A. 
and W. P. A. funds were available to parochial schools during the 
depression. Veterans receiving money under the G. I.' Bill of 1944 could 
attend denominational schools, to which payments were made directly by 
the government. During World War II, federal money was contributed to 
denominational schools for the training of nurses. The benefits of the 
National School Lunch Act are available to students in private as well as 
public schools. The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 
specifically made money available to non-public hospitals. The slogan 'In 
God We Trust' is used by the Treasury Department, and Congress recently 
added God to the pledge of allegiance. There is Bible-reading in the 
schools of the District of Columbia, and religious instruction is given in 
the District's National Training School for Boys. Religious organizations 
are exempt from the federal income tax and are granted postal privileges.
Up to defined limits -15 per cent of the adjusted gross income of 
individuals and 5 per cent of the net income of corporations - contributions
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to religious organizations are deductible for federal income tax purposes.
There are no limits to the deductibility of gifts and bequests to religious 
institutions made under the federal gift and estate tax laws. This list of 
federal 'aids' could easily be expanded, and of course there is a long list in 
each state." Fellman, The Limits of Freedom (1959), pp. 40-41. {Engel 
Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
Many of the rest of Douglas’ footnotes give further insight to the many government 
activities entrenched in religious ceremony; however, he and Justice Black saw a 
significant difference in the case of schooling. There was no indoctrination, they argued, 
but the problem seemed to lie in the non-neutral nature of the law under which the prayer 
was written, since that law was aimed at the moral and spiritual training of young 
citizens. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
Justice Stewmf went further with the tradition argument, detailing the many 
instances of presidential reference to God in public speeches as well as usage of God on 
money and in the motto of the United States. Stewart claimed, “1 think that to deny the 
wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the 
opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation.” {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 
421) Adults in the United States are subject to many unsolicited calls for prayer or 
recognition of God in the public sector. If school is to create Americans citizens prepared 
to join in the civic life of the nation, a non-denominational prayer seems fully aligned 
with the ceremonial usages of religion these citizens-in-training will confront as adults.
Judge O’Scanlain made a powerful argument about the removal of religion from 
all aspects of public life. {Newdow v. U.S. Congress 00-16423) To erase God entirely 
from the classroom would deny students the rich tradition of the United States, which can 
be found in the Declaration of Independence and in patriotic anthems and poems. It is 
possible that there are several interpretations of the idea implied in the word “God.” It is
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true that many different religions, from monotheistic to polytheistic forms, have differing 
interpretations of this concept. In the United States, there exists a secular concept of God 
as a force that has guided the country through peril and through success. It is this concept 
that is recognized in the traditional ceremonial uses of the word.
To remove God from education is to disentangle rope that has been knotted for 
too long. Original schemes of education in the United States depended on religion, and 
religion depended on education. Long-standing traditions encourage Americans to 
recognize a deity or a creator in many different ceremonial forms. These things are 
ingrained into the American culture, and as Kymlicka writes, “It is possible for a state not 
to have an established church. But the state cannot help but give at least partial 
establishment to a culture.” (1997)
Differentiation from Previous Establishment Clause Cases
Possibly the most alarming thing about the decision in Engel was its departure 
from precedent in the area of state support to religion. Engel made a distinction between 
prayer in public school and other forms of public support of religion in school. The two 
most pertinent precedents are Everson v. Board o f Education ofEwing Township and 
Zorach v. Clauson. In each instance the state was allowed to provide some support to 
students seeking religious education within the school day, either by providing bus 
transportation to parochial schools {Everson 330 U.S. I) or by allowing students to travel 
off campus in order to attend religious instruction. {Zorach 343 U.S. 306) Although 
Black distinguished the situation in Engel based on the non-neutrality of the legislation.
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Black admited the similarities and simply stated that Everson’s conclusion was incorrect.
{Engel V . Vitale 330 U.S. 421)
It was in Everson that the Court first applied the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
bringing the issue of school prayer clearly under the jurisdiction of the federal
government. It was also here that Justice Black reinvigorated the metaphor of a wall of
separation between church and state that separates the actions of each to protect each one
from the other. He wrote.
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer 
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to 
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a 
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may 
be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice 
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of 
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church 
and State.' {Everson v. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1)
After this impassioned plea for the strict separation of church and state. Black decided
that states may provide bus transportation for children to parochial schools, because it is
akin to the many other protections that a government must provide to parochial schools
and public schools without discriminating between the two, such as fire and police
protections. Therefore, the decision in Everson allowed direct state support of religious
functions so long as that support did not favor any specific religion or religion over
irréligion. (330 U.S. 1)
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It seems as if other justices on the Court were confused by this distinction as well. 
The vote of the Court was a close 5-4, and two of the dissenting justices felt compelled to 
attach dissents calling for a more complete separation of church and state. Justice 
Jackson wrote.
The Court's opinion marshals every argument in favor of state aid and puts 
the case in its most favorable light, but much of its reasoning confirms my 
conclusions that there are no good grounds upon which to support the 
present legislation. In fact, the undertones of the opinion, advocating 
complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem 
utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their 
commingling in educational matters. (Everson v. Board o f Education 330 
U.S. 1)
It is ironic that if the dissenters had prevailed in Everson rather than Black’s own 
decision becoming precedent in that case. Black’s decision in Engel would be better 
aligned with established precedent.
Zorach offers a similar situation and conclusion as does Everson. It is notable 
that Zorach is an almost complete reversal of a previous case in which the Court struck 
down release-time schemes in schools that allowed religious instructors to use school 
facilities during school hours. (McCollum v. Board o f Education 333 U.S. 306) The 
minor adjustment that allowed the Court to reverse itself, an action it rarely takes, was the 
movement of the religious instructors off school grounds. Under this scheme, children 
were allowed to be released from school during the day to report to religious instructors 
off campus and any absence was reported to the public school teacher. In the absence of 
explicit public funding or use of public facilities, the Court ruled that release-time was 
not in violation of the Establishment Clause. (Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306)
Justice Douglas sums up the arguments against the release time program as 
follows:
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Their argument, stated elaborately in various ways, reduces itself to this: 
the weight and influence of the school is put behind a program for 
religious instruction; public school teachers police it, keeping tab on 
students who are released; the classroom activities come to a halt while the 
students who are released for religious instruction are on leave; the school 
is a crutch on which the churches are leaning for support in their religious 
training; without the cooperation of the schools this "released time" 
program, like the one in the McCollum case, would be futile and 
ineffective. The New York Court of Appeals sustained the law against this 
claim of unconstitutionality (Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306)
These claims seem similar to some of the arguments involved in the Engel case in which
Douglas comes to the exact opposite conclusion. In Engel, anti-prayer forces argued that
the fact that the weight and influence of the state was put behind the prayer, that public
school teachers were involved in reading the prayer, and that there was an underlying
coercion involved in state prayer that could not be factored out by allowing students to
remain silent or to leave the room made the development of the prayer an
unconstitutional act. (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) The notable difference seems to be
that in the case of release-time, students choose the maimer of religious observance or
non-observance by choosing the religious program that each wished to attend, while in
the case of prayer, the manner of observance or non-observance was dictated by the state.
No justice in Engel drew this distinction.
Zorach, like Everson, was a closely decided case, with a high proportion of
separate dissents. Black’s position on state support of religion began to look more like
the strict separationist position he took in Engel. He wrote
Here the sole question is whether New York can use its compulsory 
education laws to help religious sects get attendants presumably too 
unenthusiastic to go unless moved to do so by the pressure of this state 
machinery. That this is the plan, purpose, design and consequence of the 
New York program caimot be denied. The state thus makes religious sects 
beneficiaries of its power to compel children to attend secular schools.
Any use of such coercive power by the state to help or hinder some
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religious sects or to prefer all religious sects over nonbelievers or vice 
versa is just what I think the First Amendment forbids. In considering 
whether a state has entered this forbidden field the question is not whether 
it has entered too far but whether it has entered at all. New York is 
manipulating its compulsory education laws to help religious sects get 
pupils. This is not separation but combination of Church and State.
{Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306)
In this case Black actually derided the argument of spiritual heritage and attached himself
whole-heartedly to the doctrine of separation.
The precedent, though highly disputed within the Court, was clear through the
published decisions in Everson and Zorach. Public support of religious institutions, even
moderate financial support, was allowable under the Constitution as long at that support
was neutral. New York made every attempt to make the Regents’ prayer neutral and non-
coercive while remaining in keeping with traditional ceremonial usage of religion. The
Court, however, separated this form of state support of religion form all other forms,
deciding that the state could not in any way have play a direct role in composing a prayer
for public schools. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) This change in Establishment Clause
interpretation created the turbid stream of Establishment Clause cases that have found
their way to the Court most recently.
Conclusion
The application of the Establishment Clause to the states has been inconsistent, 
especially with regard to state support of religion in school settings. This inconsistency 
springs largely from the decision in Engel v. Vitale, which distinguished state 
sponsorship of prayer from all other forms of state sponsorship of religion in schools. In 
one decision, the Court shifted the historical interpretation of the purpose of the
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Establishment Clause, ended a time-honored traditional link between education and 
religion, and confused accepted interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Public 
opinion against the outcome of this case has little waned, and the Court has been forced 
to decide even more recent school prayer cases as schools, districts, and states maneuver 
through the tangled precedent of Establishment Clause interpretation.
If the Court considers state financial support of religious schooling to be 
consistent with the Establishment Clause, then it should uphold school prayer. If the 
Court finds prayer abhorrent to the First Amendment, then it should strike down release­
time legislation as well. However, the Court should carefully examine its view of the 
foundations of American democracy and the traditional ties between education and 
religion, interpreting the words of the First Amendment in the light of the experience of 
the nation.
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CHAPTER 4
LEE V. WEISMAN
The nearly three decade interval between the Engel (370 U.S. 421) case and that 
of Lee V. Weisman (505 U.S. 577) found the Court seeking to clarify and codify 
Establishment Clause interpretation, but to little avail. Chief Justice Warren Burger, 
writing in Lemon v. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602), sought to present a guide for future 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause by creating a three-part test for discerning an 
acceptable level of government interaction with religion. However, by the early nineties, 
the Court seemed to have developed three different Establishment Clauses, dependent on 
the situation. In cases concerning religious displays on public property, the Court seemed 
to gradgingly accept the traditional and historical significance of symbolic religious 
displays as long as there was no overtly denominational message. {Lynch v. Donnelly 465 
U.S. 668, Allegheny v. ACLU 492 U.S. 573) Cases of school sponsored worship in the 
forms of devotional readings or even moments of silence maintained a strict 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. {Abbington v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203,
Wallace v, Jaffree 472 U.S. 38) Somewhere in the middle of these conflicting 
interpretations lay the funding cases, which remained mired in constitutional 
misunderstanding and vague constructions, leading to frequently contradictory rulings 
and even the overturning of some cases. {Aguilar v. Felton 473 U.S. 402, Agostini v. 
Felton 521 U.S. 203)
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The Court has established that the school environment is one that distinct from the 
world of American adults. Teachers and administrators are not held to strict standards of 
search and seizure protections in the school environment {New Jersey v. TLO 469 U.S. 
325); student rights to freedom of speech and press are more limited than they would be 
outside of school {Bethel v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675, Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier 484 U.S. 260). Still, the very recognition of these expression rights, first in 
1943 {West Virginia State Board o f Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624) then in the 
Tinker case of 1969 (393 U.S. 503), in addition to the more recent recognition of free 
exercise rights in Westside Community Board o f Education v. Mergens (496 U.S. 226), 
set the First Amendment at odds with itself in the lives of the nation’s students. Lee v. 
Weisman (505 U.S. 577) sought to draw a distinction between private speech and 
exercise, which was protected by the First Amendment, and public speech which was 
limited by the Establishment Clause.
Also at play in the case was the continual pull between American traditions and 
modem constitutional interpretation. The controversy in Lee sprang from a practice that 
was widely accepted and traditionally acknowledged. The decision itself, barring schools 
from allowing invocations and benedictions at public school graduations (505 U.S. 577), 
touched off a new controversy that has led to further cases. Clark County School District 
in Nevada, in response to an ACLU-led attack, has changed its policy in order to allow 
prayer at graduation by students, but only if school officials relinquish the right to prior 
review of student speeches. (Bach 2003) A case recently decided by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized the right of a public official to pray at a public 
event if the prayer is part of a private statement. {Doe v. School District o f the City o f
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NorfolklSo. 02-4135) This is a distinct representation of the inherent difficulty in 
protecting the right of private individuals to speak and to freely exercise religion while 
maintaining Establishment protections for those who choose not to participate in those 
private exercises. The precedent established in Lee has only served to further this 
conflict and has directly resulted in an attack on the Pledge of Allegiance. (Elk Grove 
Independent School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 1624)
Background of Lee v. Weisman 
When Lee, a principal of a Rhode Island middle school, invited a rabbi to speak at 
an upcoming graduation, he did not know that he was inviting a lawsuit that would 
become an important piece of Establishment Clause litigation. He had invited clergy 
before, always careful to provide his guests with a pamphlet that had been prepared by 
religious organizations in order to guide them in offering non-denominational prayer at 
public gatherings. Deborah Weisman and her father, however, took offense to this 
traditionally accepted practice and filed suit, claiming that the invocation and benediction 
to be offered at the graduation constituted an establishment of religion by the state of 
Rhode Island. (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) As the Court had previously decided, the 
non-denominational nature of the prayers and the non-coercive nature of the graduation 
ceremony would not appear to exempt this religious act from constitutional restrictions. 
(Engel V. Vitale 370 U.S. 421)
In the previous two decades, the Court had made attempts to further clarify 
Establishment Clause interpretation, first by issuing a three-pronged test by which 
statutes in question could be measured and secondly by defining further the limits on
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prayer in school. The Weismans’ arguments relied on these cases, the first restricting 
government payment to parochial schools (Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602) and the 
second striking down a mandated moment of silence for meditation and prayer in a public 
school (Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38). The school, however, relied on a decision, not 
even a decade old, allowing ceremonial use of prayer in public functions. (Marsh v. 
Chambers 463 U.S. 783) The case would pit modem, broad interpretations of the 
Establishment Clause against the force of tradition.
The Lemon Test
One of the most significant changes to Court interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause occurred between Engel and Lee. In 1971, the Court, seeking to streamline 
Establishment Clause interpretation, issued a decision that is often recognized as one of 
the most important precedents in Establishment Clause history. The case of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman (401 U.S. 192) created a three-pronged test for deciding whether or not the 
wall of separation between church and state has been breached. In order to pass 
constitutional muster, any statute which supports religion in any way must have a secular 
purpose. Secondly, the statute may not advance or inhibit religious practice. Lastly, the 
statute must not foster excessive entanglement between church and state. It is by this test 
that even the most recent Establishment Clause issues have been measured, but the Court 
seems to have made only cursory mention of this important precedent in Lee. (505 U.S. 
577)
One reason the Court may have chosen to comment little on this precedent might 
be its overall failure to create a clear and consistent means of Establishment Clause
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interpretation. As an institution, the Court is dependent upon decisions of the past to 
guide its current actions; this is called stare decisis. It is relatively rare for the Court to 
reverse itself, but it seems as if the area of religious establishment is one in which 
reversal is more common than in other areas of constitutional law. This may be related to 
the fact that there are conflicts between protection from religion through the 
Establishment Clause and protection of religion by the Free Exercise Clause of the 
Constitution. Most importantly, however, school provides a fertile ground for 
establishment conflicts as the dual private and public education systems in the United 
States interact.
Even after clarification of the Establishment Clause by Lemon, the Court found 
itself in waters mired by contradictions. Its assertion that church and state must be 
strictly separated had come into conflict with national legislation meant to provide for the 
free and equal education of students with special needs. In 1984, parents in New York 
City brought suit against the school district, since the district was paying public school 
teachers to spend time with special needs students who were attending parochial school. 
According to the district, this was the most efficient way for the state to comply with the 
federal law that forced the state to provide special services to eligible children, even if the 
parents of those children chose to send the children to private parochial schools. Though 
there was no preference for religious schools over non-religious private schools, the 
Court ruled that this practice was in direct violation of the interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause as defined in Lemon v. Kurtzman. {Aguilar v. Felton 473 U.S. 402 
1985) Lemon, in fact, was based on a similar situation in which a state was providing 
funding to private schools in order to improve secular education in those schools. The
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State money was not to be used to provide any sort of religious education and was 
distributed to all private religious and non-religious schools. (Lemon v. Kurtzman 401 
U.S. 192)
Twelve years after the decision in Aguilar, the ability of the state to serve special
needs children had been so circumscribed by the ruling as to draw further suit. In
reversing the previous decision, the decision read
In Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402.413 . this Court held that New York 
City's program that sent public school teachers into parochial schools to 
provide remedial education to disadvantaged children pursuant to Title I of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 necessitated an 
excessive entanglement of church and state and violated the First 
Amendment's Establishment Clause. On remand, the District Court 
entered a permanent injunction reflecting that ruling. Some 10 years later, 
petitioners—the parties bound by the injunction—filed motions in the same 
court seeking relief jfi'om the injunction's operation under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). They emphasized the significant costs of 
complying with Aguilar and the assertions of five Justices in Board of Ed. 
of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687. that Aguilar 
should be reconsidered, and argued that relief was proper under Rule 
60(b)(5) and Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367.388 . 
because Aguilar cannot be squared with this Court's intervening 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and is no longer good law. The 
District Court denied tiie motion on the merits, declaring that Aguilar's 
demise has "not yet occurred." The Second Circuit agreed and affirmed.
(Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203 1997)
In ruling that Aguilar was now bad law, the Court was admitting to the many
complexities of Establishment Clause interpretation in a modem world. Though decided
several years after Lee, it is indicative of the confusion in the Court regarding
interpretation of the First Amendment’s religion clauses.
The Supreme Court had also obviously spent many years chipping away at the
edifice of Lemon. Further complicating this relationship between church and state, a law
was passed by the United States Congress, allowing religious groups equal access to
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public facilities. Again schools became the battle ground as a group of students in 1990 
asked the Court to approve the creation of a Bible Club on the campus of their high 
school. Now having to consider three separate clauses of the First Amendment 
concerning freedom of speech and freedom of religion, the Court found itself approving 
the club, allowing students to speak freely about religious subjects under the constant 
supervision of a state employee on state property. {Westside Community Board o f  
Education v. Mergens 496 U.S. 226 1990) Therefore, by the time Lee landed on the 
Court’s docket, the seemingly clear and defined concept of establishment under the 
Lemon precedent seemed much less clear and much less defined. To this day, the Lemon 
test remains under judicial scrutiny, as the Court seeks to broaden the definition of 
Establishment as it applies to fimding, even allowing states to provide tax money to 
religious schools through parent choice and the use of vouchers. (Zelman v. Simmons- 
Harris 536 U.S. 639 2002)
Still, it is clear that fimding and prayer are fimdamentally different issues, since 
state support in the latter case seems more obvious than in the former. Obviously 
providing state fimding to operate a fire station that saves a parochial school from 
burning to the ground does not constitute state establishment of religion, just as busing 
students to the school of their choice does not violate this precious principle. {Everson v. 
Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1 1947) However, the Court has established precedent in 
regards to state sponsored prayer on school grounds. In Engel, the Court ruled that the 
non-denominational, non-coercive prayer violated the Establishment Clause by favoring 
religion over irréligion. The lower courts still tried to rely in part on Lemon, however, as 
the accepted Establishment Clause interpretation. In doing so, the District Court and the
64
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
United States Court of Appeals disagreed on the application of Lemon to the case. The 
District Court ruled that the prayer at graduation violated only the second prong of 
Lemon’s three-pronged test, that concerning the rule that the state can neither support nor 
inhibit the practice of religion. According to the District Court, the prayer was a direct 
support of religious practice. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that the 
actions of the rabbi had violated all three parts of the Lemon test. With such unclear 
precedent, it may be easy to understand why interpretation of Establishment Clause 
issues remain a consistent topic of legal debate. (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
As to the secular purpose of the action, one could argue that the Court has allowed 
a multitude of secular uses of God in the public realm. It is noted in the footnotes, even 
as the Court struck down state-sponsored prayer in Engel, that the history of the United 
States is littered with examples of national government support of public prayer, from the 
announcement of national days of Thanksgiving from nearly every president since 
Washington to congressional chaplains to the printing of the national motto, “In God We 
Trust,” on all national currency. (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) Though James Madison, 
according to his own Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), rejected the notion of national 
support of prayer, even he, when pressured by public opinion during the War of 1812, 
issued a proclamation for a national day of prayer and fasting. (Madison 1814) He 
justified his actions by claiming that the proclamation was merely a recommendation and 
that it would favor no religion over another. This is the same claim made by the school 
district in Lee. The presence of the rabbi was a secular tradition, the remarks he made 
favored no religion over another, and students had the option of not attending the 
graduation. (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) Scalia’s dissent in Lee predicted how far this
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precedent can go in limiting the secular uses of God in public life. He foresaw, with 
amazing accuracy, that someone would even someday challenge the inclusion of the 
words “under God,” meant to inspire patriotism during a crisis of war, in the Pledge of 
Allegiance. Ten years after the decision was issued in Lee, a claim was filed in 
California challenging just those words. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
decided that case based on the precedent established by Lee. When the case moved to the 
Supreme Court, Scalia recused himself. The Court dismissed the case based on a 
standing issue. {Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 02-1624)
The three-pronged test requires that the state neither advance nor inhibit religious 
practice. This was the one prong that the District Court claimed was violated by the state 
of New York by inclusion of the rabbi at the graduation ceremony. {Lee v. Weisman 505 
U.S. 577) That the prayer advances religion over irréligion seems an impressive 
argument to make. Clearly, the inclusion of the rabbi gives students and parents the 
impression that the state lends a certain respect and admiration to religious figures and 
treats such people as special guest speakers at important ceremonies. However, the same 
examples above provide a guide as to when support of religion in general is acceptable. 
When Madison issued his national proclamation calling for a day of prayer and fasting, 
according to the interpretations by the modem Court, he was promoting the practice of 
religion over irréligion. The respondents in this case claimed, as did Madison, that the 
non-coercive and non-denominational aspects of the action in question exempted it from 
constitutional conflict. (Madison 1814) Under the precedent in Lemon, Madison’s action 
could have been deemed unconstitutional, yet today’s presidents continue to call for 
national days of prayer, fasting, and thanksgiving. It has become a national tradition. If
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the Court could exclude these actions for their traditional value as well as for the gravity 
of the situations under which they are usually passed, then it would have been reasonable 
for the respondents in Lee to believe that the Court could make a similar exception in the 
case of graduation.
Finally, the last part of the three-pronged test requires that states not become 
excessively entangled with religion. In issuing a pamphlet to the rabbi, the state, 
according to the Court, entangled itself with religious activity. The pamphlet, which had 
been written by religious organizations, directed the rabbi in the manner of keeping his 
remarks non-denominational and tolerant. However, though there may have been tacit 
coercion by the district in providing the pamphlet, the rabbi was never threatened with 
any corrective action should he choose to make comments other than those deemed 
acceptable by the guidelines of the pamphlet. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) If the state 
was outside constitutional boundaries by providing guidelines to the speaker, many 
questions remain as to the conduct of important state ceremonies, especially ceremonies 
involving minors and parents. It is in this regard that the Establishment Clause begins to 
more directly conflict with the provision protecting freedom of speech.
If the school cannot direct a religious leader to remain non-denominational in his 
or her remarks at a public ceremony, then would those remarks be considered an 
establishment of religion once they are uttered as the private speech of the religious 
leader? Is the state to hereby refrain from inviting any religious leader or any person of 
devout religious conscience to speak at a public function out of fear that their remarks 
might be interpreted as Establishment? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
recently took up these questions. When students at a Nebraska high school voted to
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include prayer in their graduation and generated a non-denominational prayer to be led by 
a student speaker, a parent from the school filed for injunctive relief. The U.S. District 
Court in Nebraska agreed to issue the injunction, halting the planned prayer. At the 
graduation ceremony, another parent, who happened to be on stage in his role as a school 
board member, rose to speak as one parent to a sea of unsuspecting students and parents. 
The parent recited the Lord’s Prayer, an overtly Christian expression of belief, and he 
asked the crowd to join with him. This touched off a greater legal battle, as the parent 
was a school board member and was speaking at a decidedly school-sponsored event.
The board, however, had not reviewed the man’s statements prior to the speech and 
claimed no responsibility for the religious message. Faced with the challenge of 
balancing free speech with the Establishment Clause protections, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided that the claimants were not due any protection 
from the personal comments of this school board member. {John Doe v. The School 
District o f the City ofNorfolkNo. 02-4135) If the school, according to Lemon, can have 
absolutely no entanglement with religion, then the state is left with the option of simply 
inviting speakers who may present any message, even an overtly religious or dangerous 
one, to a solemn group of young people. Though this may square with the Framers’ 
intentions regarding free public speech, it seems at odds with Establishment Clause 
precedent and the deeply held tradition of religious toleration in this country. However, it 
follows precisely the precedent set in Lemon. The school board member was asked to 
share an inspirational message as a parent, a clearly secular goal. The state act of inviting 
him to speak was not based on his membership in any religious group and was not
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intended to advance or inhibit religion. Having not reviewed his comments, the state did 
nothing to entangle itself with religious practice.
In his scathing dissent. Justice Scalia took aim at the precedent in Lemon. He 
wrote, “Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled (so to speak) by 
reliance on formulaic abstractions that are not derived from, but positively conflict with, 
our long-accepted constitutional traditions. Foremost among these has been the so-called 
Lemon test.. .which has received well-earned criticism from many Members of this 
Court.” Scalia recounts the many instances of judicial conflict with this precedent and 
hopes that the Court, by ignoring the precedent, has cast off the shadow of Lemon for 
good. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) The case is still considered important legal 
precedent. It is, however, a hazy precedent, and its noticeable absence from the decision 
in Lee highlighted its main fault in that it does not seem to fulfill its function. The three­
pronged test is not a sufficient guide for the Court in drawing the line between 
accommodation of religious freedom and protection against state establishment in all 
cases. Until such precedent is established, there is little hope for clarity in the area of 
state establishment.
Marsh v. Chambers
Another useful precedent ignored by the Court was that set in the case of Marsh v. 
Chambers (463 U.S. 783 1983), in which the Court ruled that the use of congressional 
chaplains did not violate the Establishment Clause, since it was a ceremonial usage of 
religion with deep roots in American history. The Court refused to classify the use of 
prayer at graduation in a similar manner, claiming that significant differences existed in
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the context of the prayers which made the graduation prayer a form of government 
support of religion while exempting the legislative ceremony. First, the Court asserted 
that adults serving in a legislative environment could enter and leave the room as they 
pleased during invocations without any notice being taken or any judgment being passed 
as a result of their actions. Second, the Court asserted that a graduation prayer had more 
influence over the minds of the graduating class members than a congressional invocation 
would have over adult legislators. Last, the state control of the content of the graduation 
prayer, in the form of the pamphlet, distinguished this practice from that of hiring a 
chaplain who may direct the content of his own daily prayers. (Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 
577)
Marsh is admittedly a singular exception to the Lemon test precedent, and the
Court took special note of its extraordinary circumstances. The precedent established in
Marsh had more to do with the tradition and history of the practice of congressional
chaplains, which predated even the writing of the federal Constitution. The Court held:
The practice of opening sessions of Congress with prayer has continued 
without interruption for almost 200 years ever since the First Congress 
drafted the First Amendment, and a similar practice has been followed for 
more than a century in Nebraska and many other states. While historical 
patterns, standing alone, cannot justify contemporary violations of 
constitutional guarantees, historical evidence in the context of this case 
sheds light not only on what the drafters of the First Amendment intended 
the Establishment Clause to mean but also on how they thought that 
Clause applied to the chaplaincy practice authorized by the First Congress.
In applying the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it would be incongruous to interpret the Clause as imposing 
more stringent First Amendment limits on the states than the draftsmen 
imposed on the Federal Government. In light of the history, there can be 
no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has 
become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke divine guidance on a 
public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, 
a violation of the Establishment Clause; it is simply a tolerable
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acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.
(Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783)
Based on this peculiar historical context, the Court found no reason to believe that the
Constitution would have meant to eliminate the practice. Also, the Court had previous
recognized as exceptions, the particular uses of what Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has
come to name “secular deism” in the use of chaplains by the United States Congress,
presidential proclamations of days of prayer and fasting, and the invocation of God by the
marshal of the Supreme Court at the beginning of any day on which cases are heard in the
Court. The exceptions appear in the footnotes of Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421).
In the case of Lee v. Weisman (505 U.S. 577), the Court rejected the historical
argument entirely. The Court noted that public education itself is a relatively new feature
of American democracy, therefore the existence of invocations and benedictions at public
school graduation ceremonies does not carry with it the full weight of history and
tradition of congressional prayer. As noted in Engel, among other school cases,
compulsory attendance laws create a very specific, state-sponsored, environment for
speech and religion in schools. (370 U.S. 421) School children are particularly
susceptible to indoctrination by school officials, since these officials are placed in a
position of authority over students in a school environment. Any religious utterance by
these respected authority figures may result in undue religious inculcation of students
against the will of the students or their parents.
In Lee, however, the Court was presented with a very different type of
environment, in which students are not required to be in attendance, and the importance
of the ceremony in the lives of the students might gives schools reason to believe that
ceremonial recognition of religion is appropriate. As the beginning of a congressional
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day might call for recognition of God’s guidance of elected representatives, the passage
of students from one phase of their lives into another might similarly call for recognition
of God’s blessings and guidance. In rejecting this argument, the Court drew the
following distinctions between the congressional environment and that of a graduation
Inherent differences between the public school system and a session of a 
state legislature distinguish this case from Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983). The considerations [505 U.S. 577, 597] we have raised in 
objection to the invocation and benediction are, in many respects, similar 
to the arguments we considered in Marsh. But there are also obvious 
differences. The atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state 
legislature, where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment 
and for any number of reasons, cannot compare with the constraining 
potential of the one school event most important for the student to attend.
The influence and force of a formal exercise in a school graduation are far 
greater than the prayer exercise we condoned in Marsh. The Marsh 
majority in fact gave specific recognition to this distinction, and placed 
particular reliance on it in upholding the prayers at issue there. 463 U.S.. 
at 792 . Today's case is different. At a h i ^  school graduation, teachers 
and principals must and do retain a high degree of control over the precise 
contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the 
dress, and the decorum of the students. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). In this atmosphere, the state-imposed 
character of an invocation and benediction by clergy selected by the 
school combine to make the prayer a state-sanctioned religious exercise in 
which the student was left with no alternative but to submit. (Lee v.
Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
According to the majority opinion, the choice not to attend graduation was an untenable
one for a dissenter. Even though the graduation ceremony was technically not required
for receipt of a diploma, one could not expect a student to forgo such an important event
simply out of protest of a religious activity. Students were asked to remain standing
quietly during the graduation prayer, leaving no means for a dissenter to express his or
her dissent. To the common observer, the dissenter would be seen to be participating in
the prayer activity.
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Souter’s dissent disregarded the practice in Marsh as something of minimal
importance, claiming that most Americans take little notice of congressional prayer, days
of thanksgiving and fasting, and presidential proclamations of any religious variety. The
American public chooses to largely ignore these traditional aspects of government, while
it is seemingly impossible for a graduate and her family at a high school graduation to
ignore the direct government approval of religious activity. Souter noted,
Petitioners would deflect this conclusion by arguing that graduation 
prayers are no different from presidential religious proclamations and 
similar official "acknowledgments" of religion in public life. But religious 
invocations in Thanksgiving Day addresses and the like, rarely noticed, 
ignored without effort, conveyed over an impersonal medium, and 
directed at no one in particular, inhabit a pallid zone worlds apart from 
official prayers delivered to a captive audience of public school students 
and their families. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
In dravdng the distinctions between the congressional and graduation environment, the
Court rejects the argument that graduation prayers are a form of ceremonial deism.
In his dissent. Justice Scafia took the majority to task for the broad strokes it took
with the Marsh precedent. In Marsh, the Court had noted that the practice of
congressional chaplains predated the U.S. Constitution, while in Lee no such claim was
possible since publicly fiinding schooling was such a new addition to the framework of
U.S. government. Scafia noted that, at the very least, prayer at public school graduation
predated the Fourteenth Amendment, through which the First Amendment was applied to
state governments. He claimed that the majority opinion, “lays waste a tradition that is as
old as public school ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an even more
longstanding American tradition of non-sectarian prayer to God at public celebrations
generally.” Scafia went on to detail the public tradition as well as to describe the first
recorded public school graduation in history. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
73
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
With regard to the Court’s distinction of the ability of adults in Congress to show 
dissent without even being noticed, in that they can enter and leave the room at will, 
Scalia pointed out three poignant facts. First, the students in question are graduating, 
marking a transition from youth to adulthood, yet the Court treated them the same as it 
would treat first graders in an elementary school classroom for the time that they were 
involved in the ceremony. Second, students were asked to stand quietly with bowed 
heads during the reading of invocations and benedictions, yet there was no punishment 
for either raising one’s head or for sitting down, granting dissenters the right to express 
their dissent reasonably. Third, that remaining respectfully silent while another expresses 
his or her belief is a civic skill that students should be taught. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 
577)
The rejection of the precedent of Marsh created another situation in which school 
prayer became the exception to an otherwise accepted constitutional rule. The Court has 
repeatedly been willing to recognize the traditional practice of invoking the name of the 
creator during crises or important events. Although Madison is widely viewed as a 
separationist (Lindsay 1991), even he issued three separate proclamations of days of 
prayer and fasting during a time of war. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) As Van Alstyne 
suggests, “the Court has rejected a number of arguments still troublesome to the 
historically-minded.” (1963) The case of Lee provides some of these arguments.
The Court here stated that public accommodation of an historical religious 
tradition through prayers offered by Congress, the President, and even the marshal of the 
Supreme Court itself has no bearing on a public school atmosphere, even in a one-time 
important ceremony such as graduation. In short, prayer in school could be
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accommodated the way that other publie prayer can. The rejeetion of the prineiple of 
Lemon basically stated that accommodation of religion through prayer is somehow 
fimdamentally different than accommodation of religion through taxpayer support, the 
latter of which was more directly the aim of the First Amendment when it was 
constructed. Therefore, through this troubling precedent, the Court defined the school 
environment as something that does not resemble the world outside of it, the world for 
which students are meant to be prepared through the process of schooling.
Coercion
Much of the debate in Lee revolved around tiie issue of state coercion of religious 
activity. According to the Weismans’ and subsequently, the Court’s decision, the 
invocation and benediction offered at the public school graduation reeked of state 
coercion as demonstrated by the request that students remain standing with bowed heads 
during both events and the sense that students felt obligated to attend the graduation 
ceremony. The school argued that remaining silent did not force participation in the 
prayer and that the graduation ceremony was purely optional. In turn, the Court focused 
much of its attention on the rights of the reasonable dissenter in the situation presented. 
{Lee V. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
Justice Souter rightfidly noted in his concurrence, “The Framers adopted the 
Religion Clauses in response to a long tradition of coercive state support for religion, 
particularly in the form of tax assessments.” {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) Madison 
and Jefferson firmly objected to such a tax in the state of Virginia. (Madison 1785) 
Supreme Court precedent even prior to Lee seems to allow this type of coercion {Everson
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V. Board o f Education 330 U.S. 1, Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306) while Lee rejects a 
much more subtle and indefinable type of coercion. In fact, these two different types of 
precedent have led to a further broadening of Establishment Clause interpretation with 
respect to the use of tax money in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (0536 U.S. 639) while 
interpretation in regards to prayer services on school property has been further narrowed. 
{Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 530 U.S. 290) The difference between 
these two types of cases plays on the role of coercion or choice. According to modem 
Court interpretation, school vouchers are acceptable accommodation because parents 
exert choice in directing the voucher contributions to the parochial or public school of 
their choosing. The Court defines the school environment, even at extra-curricular 
activities, to be fiuught with subtle coercive pressure that prey on young, fragile minds, 
even when students have the choice to participate or not in said non-denominational 
religious activities.
In Lee, the Court created a broad definition of coercion not based on legal 
sanction but based on the psychology of adolescents. According to Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s majority opinion, the simple request that students stand with heads bowed 
during the ceremony was enough to constitute an indirect, subtle coercive power creating 
a psychological pressure to at least appear to participate in the religious activity. He 
stated:
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a 
high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer 
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain 
respectfiil silence during the invocation and benediction. This pressure, 
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion. Of 
course, in our culture, standing or remaining silent can signify adherence 
to a view or simple respect for the views of others. And no doubt some 
persons who have no desire to join a prayer have little objection to
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standing as a sign of respect for those who do. But for the dissenter of high 
school age, who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the 
State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow, the injury is no 
less real. There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the students 
at the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression 
of participation in the rabbi's prayer. That was the very point of the 
religious exercise. It is of little comfort to a dissenter, then, to be told that, 
for her, the act of standing or remaining in silence signifies mere respect, 
rather than participation. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
Therefore, what one might see as an act of respect, the dissenter interprets as an act of
coercion to participate in religious activities. This is not the direct coercion of taking tax
money from an individual in order to transfer such payment to a religiously sponsored
activity, nor is it the coercion of punishment of dissent according to conscience.
According to the Court, the coercion lies in the fact that the dissenter feels, whether it is
truth or not, that he or she simply cannot dissent without boycotting a ceremony marking
an important life event.
The First Amendment exists to protect freedom of conscience in religious and
political matters as well as the expression of those beliefs with minimal government
interference. Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurrence claimed, “There is no doubt that
attempts to aid religion through government coercion jeopardize freedom of conscience.
Even subtle pressure diminishes the right of each individual to choose voluntarily what to
believe.” {Lee v Weisman 505 U.S. 577) This echoes Madison’s claim that religious
belief and practice can be directed only by the individual’s conscience and will, not by
the government’s direction or intervention. (Madison 1785) Still the claim that the
government was somehow forcing students to participate in a religious activity simply by
requesting that they stand in respect for a religious speaker at a government ceremony
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
seems to lack merit. The Court’s decision relies, instead, on an indirect, intangible,
subtle psychological coercion.
Scalia’s scathing dissent on the coercion issue claimed that the “Court has gone
beyond the realm where judges know what they are doing. The Court’s argument that
state officials have ‘coerced’ students to take part in the invocation and benediction at
graduation ceremonies is, not to put too fine a point on it, incoherent.” {Lee v. Weisman
505 U.S. 577) In fact, dissenting students still had a means of expressing their dissent
without being overly disruptive of the ceremony, Scalia pointed out.
This assertion - the very linchpin of the Court's opinion - is almost as 
intriguing for what it does not say as for what it says. It does not say, for 
example, that students are psychologically coerced to bow their heads, 
place their hands in a Durer-like prayer position, pay attention to the 
prayers, utter "Amen," or in fact pray. (Perhaps further intensive 
psychological research remains to be done on these matters.) It claims 
only that students are psychologically coerced "to stand . . .  or, at least, 
maintain respectful silence."
He further accused the Court of not giving enough thought to the test of psychological
coercion in a particularly ominous statement noting that the Court seemed not to bother at
all with the fact that students had, only moments previous, stood in solemn respect for the
Pledge of Allegiance, which now contains the phrase “under God,” possibly raising a
similar Establishment Clause issue. Scalia implied that under the psychological coercion
test applied to the prayer, it would be just as unconstitutional for the state to coerce
students to stand in respect of a declared allegiance to the United States government, in
that the First Amendment protects fi-eedom of conscience in regard to government policy
as well as to religion. As Scalia puts it, “I see no warrant for expanding the concept of
coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty.”
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Scalia’s dissent brought up the important notion of broadening the Establishment
Clause to the point that no government accommodation of religion is permissible, thereby
negating, in certain circumstances, the Free Exercise Clause. Also, if government,
especially schools, can have no interaction with religious belief, then the study of
American history and government will be lacking in content and clarity, as so much of
the history and tradition of the United States has, at its core, a set of religious belief. This
is why Scalia listed, again, the many instances of public recognition of God in
government ceremonies. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
The Court also argued that the graduation ceremony itself was obligatory in a
“real and fair” sense. Although students could have choosen not to attend the ceremony,
that seemed an untenable position, to the Court, for a student at a crossroads in his or her
life to forego the graduation ceremony out of a wish to dissent from prayer at such a
ceremony. The argument about the importance of the affair was two-fold; however, as
such an important event may warrant a prayer service. Kennedy discussed the double
edge of this argument when he wrote, “The importance of the event is the point the
school district and the United States rely upon to argue that a formal prayer ought to be
permitted, but it becomes one of the principal reasons the argument must fail.” {Lee v.
Weisman 505 U.S. 577) Scalia struck back.
But let us assume the very worst, that the nonparticipating graduate is 
"subtly coerced". . .  to stand! Even that half of the disjunctive does not 
remotely establish a "participation" (or an "appearance of participation") 
in a religious exercise. The Court acknowledges that, "in our culture, 
standing . . .  can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for the 
views of others." Ibid. (Much more often the latter than the former, I think, 
except perhaps in the proverbial town meeting, where one votes by 
standing.) But if it is a permissible inference that one who is standing is 
doing so simply out of respect for the prayers of others that are in 
progress, then how can it possibly be said that a "reasonable dissenter. . .
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could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or 
approval"? Quite obviously, it cannot. I may add, moreover, that 
maintaining respect for the religious observances of others is a 
fimdamental civic virtue that government (including the public schools) 
can and should cultivate - so that, even if it were the case that the 
displaying of such respect might be mistaken for taking part in the prayer,
I would deny that the dissenter's interest in avoiding even the false 
appearance of participation constitutionally trumps the government's 
interest in fostering respect for religion generally.
Therefore, according to Scalia, even if students are coerced, it is not necessarily an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion, but more a civic exercise in keeping with the
tradition of graduation ceremonies and American public recognition of God in general.
The Framers of the First Amendment sought to prevent the kind of religious
establishments in which person were forced to support religion, usually through taxation.
(Annals 1 1790) There is a long, recognized history of recognition of God at public
functions by Congress, the President, and even the Court itself. {Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S.
421) This tradition found its way into the very first recorded public school graduation.
{Lee V. Weisman 505 U.S. 577, Scalia in dissent) Although the Court recognized the
tradition in other environments {Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783), it refused to
recognize the traditional nature of prayer at school graduations as an effect of the “subtle
coercive pressure” exerted on students in a school-sponsored environment. This coercion
is not the type that the Framers had in mind when constructing the First Amendment.
Nowhere in the writings of the Framers is found any reference to subtle psychological
pressures of being asked to stand out of respect.
The Court paid little mind to the nondenominational nature of the prayer or to the
fact that no student was forced to pray, claiming that the idea that the prayer simply
offered a choice to attending students is misleading. Even Justice Souter’s concurrence
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recognized that Madison, deemed the chief author of the Establishment Clause, argued 
that his proclamations of prayer and fasting were mitigated by the fact that they were 
mere suggestions and condoned no particular religion. Although Souter called this an 
admission of backsliding, it does give some credence to the argument the rabbi’s 
invocation offered a chance for prayer for those who wished to join. {Lee v. Weisman 
505 U.S. 577) The weight of argument laid at the feet of the student dissenter, allows the 
dissenter a sort of heckler’s veto over a traditional event.
State Sponsorship of Religious Activity 
In concurrence. Justice Blackmun recognized the fact that Supreme Court 
precedent in the area of school prayer does not require coercion of the student in order to 
effect a violation of the Establishment Clause. He wrote, “proof of government coercion 
is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation.” {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 
577) Therefore, the discussion of coercion can even be considered inconsequential given 
the overt state sponsorship of a religious activity as evidenced by the choice of the Rabbi 
as a speaker at graduation and the direction of the content of the prayer through use of the 
pamphlet. Kennedy stated, “The government involvement with religious activity in this 
case is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious 
exercise in a public school.” {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
Again, the Court departed from precedent to identify prayer in school as a very 
specific instance of state sponsorship of religion that is not allowed, whereas other forms 
of sponsorship are allowed. The Court allowed release time {Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 
306) and use of school facilities for meetings of religious groups. {Westside Community
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Board o f Education v. Mergens 496 U.S. 226) State sponsorship of prayer and similar 
religious activity is allowed in the case of congressional chaplains {Marsh v. Chambers 
463 U.S. 783) and military chaplains {Katcoff v. Marsh 755 F.2d 223). While striking 
down non-denominational prayer in schools, the Court littered Engel with footnotes 
detailing acceptable government sponsorship of religion outside the public school sphere. 
(370 U.S. 421)
The Aftermath of Lee 
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (530 U.S. 290)
The precedent set by Lee v. Weisman as well as Lemon v. Kurtzman swept so 
broadly as to be interpreted less than a decade later as prohibiting student-led, student- 
chosen prayer at public school football games. Since the school had allowed and 
encouraged the election of a student-chaplain for such events, the Court concluded that, 
“These invocations are authorized by a government policy and take place on government 
property at government-sponsored school-related events.” {Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe 530 U.S. 290) It seems as if simply the fact that the school was aware that 
the student chaplain was elected to utter a religious statement in a school context places 
the stamp of approval upon the utterance, claiming that the school policy actually 
encouraged religious messages, although it did not specifically indicate in its policy what 
types of messages the student speaker would be allowed to convey. The Court objected to 
the idea that election of a chaplain by a majority vote would promote both democracy and 
a sort of tradition civic religion. Instead, the opinion argued that such votes demean and 
dismiss minority viewpoints fi-om the public sphere. Relying on Lee, the Court asserted
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that the football prayer is coercive to the students who would like to participate in 
extracurricular activities. Again, the claim that the choice between participation and 
protest was an untenable one for the average student dissenter is reasserted. Further, the 
Court made this decision before any student speaker uttered a word, arguing that even the 
mere threat of a religious message was enough to strike down the policy on its face.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent focused on the reassertion of the Lemon test in 
school prayer settings, claiming that a Lemon test assessment of the policy would show 
that the election of the student speaker did not violate the test and actually protected 
freedom of speech and exercise. Rehnquist then detailed the many divergences the Court 
has taken from the Lemon test, arguing that the test should be abolished since it is so 
unclear. He concluded, “The policy at issue here may be applied in an unconstitutional 
manner, but it will be time enough to invalidate it if it is found to be the case.” {Lee v. 
Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
In short. Doe used the precedent in Lee to basically invalidate any religious 
utterance on school grounds that does not take place in a club setting. The non-coercive 
nature of the prayer, even at a completely optional event, does not bear on the 
constitutionality of the prayer. The student-led nature of the activity does not bear on the 
constitutionality of the prayer. The democratic nature of the activity does not bear on the 
constitutionality of the prayer. More importantly, the free exercise and speech rights of 
the speaker do not bear on the constitutionality of the prayer. Seemingly, it is enough 
that the school was aware that a religious message might have been uttered for the 
activity to be struck down in accordance with the Establishment Clause of the 
Constitution.
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For accomodationists, this turn in precedent was a frightening affront to the 
history and tradition of non-sectarian public prayer in the United States. It is a 
misrepresentation of the purpose of the Framers of the amendment. It is an 
overbroadening of the Establishment Clause. It is, furthermore, out of step with other 
Establishment Clause precedent regarding public funding and accommodation of 
religious behavior and belief in public places.
Elk Grove Independent School District v. Newdow (000 U.S. 02-1624)
The most recent effect of Lee on American jurisprudence is the challenge to the
phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance. In his dissent, Scalia foresaw this
challenge when he wrote.
The opinion manifests that the Court itself has not given careful 
consideration to its test of psychological coercion. For if it had, how could 
it observe, with no hint of concern or disapproval, that students stood for 
the Pledge of Allegiance, which immediately preceded Rabbi Gutterman's 
invocation? Ante, at 583. The government can, of course, no more coerce 
political orthodoxy than religious orthodoxy. West [505 U.S. 577, 639]
Virginia Bd. of E d v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.642 (1943). Moreover, 
since the Pledge of Allegiance has been revised since Barnette to include 
the phrase "under God," recital of the Pledge would appear to raise the 
same Establishment Clause issue as the invocation and benediction. If 
students were psychologically coerced to remain standing during the 
invocation, they must also have been psychologically coerced, moments 
before, to stand for (and thereby, in the Court's view, take part in or appear 
to take part in) the Pledge. Must the Pledge therefore be barred from the 
public schools (both from graduation ceremonies and from the 
classroom)? In Barnette, we held that a public school student could not be 
compelled to recite the Pledge; we did not even hint that she could not be 
compelled to observe respectful silence - indeed, even to stand in 
respectful silence - when those who wished to recite it did so. Logically, 
that ought to be the next project for the Court's bulldozer.
A decade later, Michael Newdow, on behalf of his biological daughter, filed that very
challenge. Although the Court struck down the challenge based on Newdow’s custodial
relationship with the child, many justices felt impelled to comment on the merits of the
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case. Given his many public statements regarding die issue, Scalia recused himself from
the case, leaving the most vehement voice on the Court to be Justice Thomas. {Elk Grove
Independent School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 02-1624)
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor took the opportunity to reaffirm the constitutional
soundness of making reference to God in public ceremonies, but did not lay blame for the
incorrect judgment of the lower court at the feet of an incorrect decision in Lee.
O’Connor applied what she calls an “endorsement test” based on expected reaction and
interpretation of a reasonable observer in a social context rich with history and tradition.
Where she failed to recognize the traditional value of invocations and benedictions at
graduations ceremonies, a traditional activity that dated back to the mid nineteenth
century, she recognized a traditional significance in the use of “under God” in the Pledge
of Allegiance when the phrase was added in the mid twentieth century. She noted.
The Court has permitted government, in some instances, to refer to or 
commemorate religion in public life. See, e.g., Pinette, supra; Allegheny, 
supra; Lynch, supra; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983). While the 
Court's explicit rationales have varied, my own has been consistent; I 
believe that although these references speak in the language of religious 
belief, they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for 
essentially secular purposes. One such purpose is to commemorate the role 
of religion in our history. In my view, some references to religion in 
public life and government are the inevitable consequence of our Nation's 
origins. Just as the Court has refused to ignore changes in the religious 
composition of our Nation in explaining the modem scope of the Religion 
Clauses, see, e.g., Wallace, supra, at 52-54 (even if the Religion Clauses 
were originally meant only to forestall intolerance between Christian sects, 
they now encompass all forms of religious conscience), it should not deny 
that our history has left its mark on our national traditions. It is 
unsurprising that a Nation founded by religious refugees and dedicated to 
religious freedom should find references to divinity in its symbols, songs, 
mottoes, and oaths.*- Eradicating such references would sever ties to a 
history that sustains this Nation even today. {Elk Grove Independent 
School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 02-1624)
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According to O’Connor’s endorsement test, it is appropriate to acknowledge God in a 
patriotic manner but not in a manner that is purely traditional without reference to the 
history and tradition of the United States. Given the invocation that the rabbi had written 
for the graduation in question in Lee, it is difficult to see O’Connor’s dissatisfaction with 
the outcome of the school sponsored activity. The prayer read,
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of 
minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow 
up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to 
guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for 
its court system where all may seek justice, we thank You. May those we honor 
this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America, we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop 
Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our hope 
for the future, be richly fulfilled.
AMEN {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577)
The prayer’s specific mention of patriotic traditions might make it acceptable. The fact
that the content may have been influenced by the pamphlet given to the rabbi in
preparation for the event; however, seems to have been a particular point of contention in
Lee.
O’Connor’s endorsement test fails here. If patriotic and traditional recognition of 
God in public ceremonies is acceptable, but controlling the content of religious messages 
in a school context is unacceptable, then schools are left with no choice but to disregard 
and abandon traditional prayer practices in all instances, including the Pledge of 
Allegiance. It is unclear why it is acceptable for Congress to incorporate religious 
messages into public formats such as the Pledge, congressional prayer, and the 
imprintation of the national motto on money, while it is unconstitutional for schools to try
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to incorporate religious messages into public formats while trying to maintain a
traditional non-sectarian, non-coercive format. The wording of the Establishment Clause
and its original interpretation would guide the Court in the opposite direction, stripping
Congress of this right and granting it to state governments.
Rehnquist also accepted the legitimacy of the Pledge without specifically
attacking Lee. He recounted, yet again, the tradition of religious invocation in the public
sphere from George Washington to modem presidents. He then laments that the same
problem that arises in Lee, the introduction of the heckler’s veto that grants so much
power to the dissenter that the rights of the majority are restricted. Rehnquist wrote.
There is no doubt that respondent is sincere in his atheism and rejection of 
a belief in God. But the mere fact that he disagrees with this part of the 
Pledge does not give him a veto power over the decision of the public 
schools that willing participants should pledge allegiance to the flag in the 
manner prescribed by Congress. There may be others who disagree, not 
with the phrase "under God," but with the phrase "with liberty and justice 
for all." But surely that would not give such objectors the right to veto the 
holding of such a ceremony by those willing to participate. Only if it can 
be said that the phrase "under God" somehow tends to the establishment of 
a religion in violation of the First Amendment can respondent's claim 
succeed, where one based on objections to "with liberty and justice for all" 
fails. Our cases have broadly interpreted this phrase, but none have gone 
anywhere near as far as the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case.
The recital, in a patriotic ceremony pledging allegiance to the flag and to 
the Nation, of the descriptive phrase "under God" cannot possibly lead to 
the establishment of a religion, or anything like it. {Elk Grove Independent 
School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 02-1624)
Rehnquist believed, as do many, that the Court had expanded the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause so far as to become oppressive to the free expression of the nations
citizens and also restrictive of the nation’s traditions.
Clarence Thomas, the most vocal commentator in the Pledge case, took the Court
to task for the decades of Establishment Clause precedent that led to the current problem.
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including the Everson v. Board o f Education case which incorporated the Establishment
Clause to the states. He wrote, “I would welcome the opportunity to consider more fully
the difficult questions whether and how the Establishment Clause applies against the
States. One observation suffices for now: As strange as it sounds, an incorporated
Establishment Clause prohibits exactly what the Establishment Clause protected—state
practices that pertain to ‘an establishment of religion.’” Justice Thomas argued that the
Establishment Clause never should have been incorporated, since incorporation is
reserved for fimdamental individual liberties, and, as he claimed, the protection against
Establishment is not an individual liberty but a protection of the states against federal
infringement. Thomas lays the blame for the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit squarely on the Supreme Court’s precedent in Lee. Thomas’ concern
with Lee revolved around the fact that it expanded precedent so far as to prohibit even the
slightest recognition of God in a school context. Thomas argues,
I conclude that, as a matter of our precedent, the Pledge policy is 
unconstitutional. I believe, however, that Lee was wrongly decided. Lee 
depended on a notion of "coercion" that, as I discuss below, has no basis 
in law or reason. The kind of coercion implicated by the Religion Clauses 
is that accomplished "by force o f law and threat ofpenalty." 505 U. S.. at 
640 {Scalia, J., dissenting); see id, at 640-645. Peer pressure, unpleasant 
as it may be, is not coercion. But rejection of Zee-style "coercion" does 
not suffice to settle this case. Although children are not coerced to pledge 
their allegiance, they are legally coerced to attend school. Cf., e.g.,
Schempp, supra; Engel v. Vitcile, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Because what is at 
issue is a state action, the question becomes whether the Pledge policy 
implicates a religious liberty right protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. {Elk Grove Independent School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 
02-1624)
Therefore, the problem with the Lee case stemmed from the distortion of the 
Establishment Clause fi'om a protection of federalism to an individual right, added to the 
Engel contortion of the meaning of coercion. By these precedents, the recognition of
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God in the Pledge of Allegiance in a school context would violate the Establishment 
Clause while the same words uttered in a congressional context or by a president at a 
public event would pass constitutional muster.
Conclusion
The precedent in Lee needlessly departed from the precedents in both Lemon and 
Marsh. Depending on interpretation, the Court could have chosen to strike down the 
graduation prayer using either precedent. Appellate courts had argued that the prayer 
violated two or three of the prongs of the Lemon test. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) 
Still, the Court disregarded Lemon, partially due to its inability to clarify the boundaries 
of government accommodation of religion or traditional activities. Marsh, on the other 
hand, dealt directly with the role of traditional secular deism in public ceremony. The 
Court cast off Marsh as not relating to the particularly sensitive environment created by 
school. The Court instead relied on precedent set in Engel v. Vitale, a previous school 
prayer case, and one of the more controversial decisions in Court history, if only for its 
disregard of the traditional role of morality and religion in the public school classroom. 
{Engel V. Vitale 370 U.S. 421) This break from more widely accepted precedent and the 
continuation of the segregation of the school environment from the adult world in the 
area of religion seems to have deepened confusion regarding the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause. Monetary support of religion in schools relies on different 
precedent than state recognition of religious activity which relies on different precedent 
than state sponsored prayer in places other than school which relies on different
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precedent than school prayer. Each of these situations invokes a unique interpretation of 
the Clause.
Lee deepened the divide between Court and public on the issue of school prayer. 
Polling data show that parents and students are still interested in incorporating some 
recognition of a higher power into public school events. (Green and Guth 1989; Jacoby 
1990; Servin- Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999) The Court also granted an 
overpowering right of religious minorities and dissenters to stop non-denominational, 
non-coercive practices on the basis that they are state sponsored. Rather than rule by 
majority with respect to the minority, this continued the development of a system of 
precedent by which the minority rules, giving more credence to the rights of non- 
observers that to the system of tradition and history that endorses the practice of prayer at 
public ceremonies. (Way and Burt 1983)
The majority decision in Lee also expanded the conception of coercion in 
American jurisprudence, but only as it applies to children in a school setting. Where the 
Court had previously admitted a long tradition of non-sectarian public support of religion 
in many cases, reiterated in Lee by Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Souter disregarded this 
entire history as misinterpretations of the Establishment Clause. The majority, however, 
upheld many of these public recognitions of God. The Court treated the schoolhouse as 
an entirely different type of environment, rife with coercive forces and restrictions on 
expression. {Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577) This not only separated the school 
environment from the adult environment, even at graduation, which is supposed to mark 
a transition from youth to adulthood, it also separated the protections of expression of 
non-religious beliefs in school campuses from other forms of expression and dissent in
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the same environment. {Tinker v. Des Moines School District 393 U.S. 503 , West 
Virginia State board o f Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 ) If the Court had chosen to 
follow the precedent set in a decision only two years prior to Lee, it may have chosen to 
allow the religious expression even with state support. Westside Community Board o f  
Education v. Mergens allows the expression of religious beliefs by students, even with 
the state support of a state-funded teacher-adviser who administrates the activities if the 
religious group. (496 U.S. 226)
The effects of Lee drove a wedge between traditional practices and the 
requirements of the Court. It led to the facial challenge of a pre-game prayer practice in 
Texas that was democratically supported by students of the district in question. {Sante Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe 530 U.S.290) The most recent scandal that has 
grovra out of the Lee decision has been the challenge to the phrase “under God” in the 
Constitution. {Elk Grove Independent School District v. Newdow 000 U.S. 1264) 
Although the Court sidestepped the merits in the case by denying standing to Michael 
Newdow, he has refiled the case in the federal district courts under different 
circumstances.
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CHAPTER 5
POLICY GOALS AND A MODEST PROPOSAL 
Goals
It should be no surprise that with differing definitions of problems associated with 
school prayer policy, separationists and accomodationists disagree as to the goals of the 
Establishment Clause protections as they apply to school prayer. First of all, the main 
goal of any policy in the American republic is to provide representation of majority 
opinions with respect to minority rights. Conflicting claims to rights under the 
Establishment Clause and under the Free Exercise complicate the issue fiirther with 
accomodationists claiming violations of their free exercise rights and separationists 
claiming violation of the Establishment Clause. Though the issue of majority sentiment is 
clear (Green and Guth 1989; Jacoby 1990; Servin- Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999), the 
definition of minority rights is not.
Accomodationist goals include the maintenance of religious tradition. Alexis de 
Tocqueville observed that the fate of democracy rested on the strength of its religious 
tradition, and that even diverse traditions can be adapted to a Democracy. (Tocqueville 
Democracv in America Volume 1 Part 2 Chapter 9) Key founders of the United States 
government who were famous for their religious skepticism still supported the need for 
religious education in the maintenance of a firee society. (Reichley 1986) In fostering 
religious tradition and practice in the public schools, accomodationists seek to provide a
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respect for the religious traditions of the nation and a solid foundation for democratic 
government.
Until 1963, it seems, the prayer supporters were upfront about their goals. Both 
petitioners and respondents in the case of Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) agreed that the 
Regents’ Prayer was a religious practice, but the respondents claimed that there was a 
state interest in encouraging religious activity. Separationists see no state interest. Since 
then, accomodationists have tried to couch their religious goals in relatively secular 
language. Since the problem in Engel seemed to be that the state had written the prayer 
and that there may be subtle coercion, the state of Alabama authorized a statute that 
would provide public school children with a moment of silence for prayer and meditation. 
The goal was the same, to support religious activity and respect the tradition of beginning 
a day with prayer. The Court struck this provision down as well. {Wallace v. Jajfree 472 
U.S. 38) Since then the accomodationists have relied on the footnotes from Engel which 
allow ceremonial usage (370 U.S. 421) to justify prayer at graduation {Lee v. Weisman 
505 U.S. 577) and prayer at the beginning of football games {Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. DOE 530 U.S. 290) Each of these cases tried to cast prayer in the light 
of a secular tradition that could really neither further nor inhibit anyone’s practices, but 
the implied goal of the tradition was to encourage religious activity according to the 
Court.
Separationists seek to protect non-believers and believers alike from government 
involvement in religious practices. Their goal is to drive a wedge of separation between 
church and state, and in the matter of school prayer, each decision has driven the wedge 
deeper. This wedge protects religion from state interference and protects people from the
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fervors of religious persecution. (Carroll 1967) The ultimate goal of the separationist is 
to eradicate prayer or any religious activity from public schools. None of the 
compromises, such as moments of non-denominational prayer, non-coercive prayer, 
student-led prayer, and ceremonial prayer, have been acceptable to the separationists.
Policy Alternatives 
School prayer is often seen as an all or nothing endeavor. Either the school 
supports prayer or it does not. There are, however, many alternatives to the win-lose 
approach that the Court has taken in school prayer cases. There may be a way to satisfy 
the main goals of each side of the argument, respect tradition, encourage moral values, 
and still protect the rights of non-believers. Below, find a matrix of policy alternatives 
and their probable effects. Of course, many of these effects are perceived. The 
assumption that believers and non-believers deserve the same protection is taken as a 
given. The chart focuses on daily prayer, and does not reference prayer at special events 
such as graduations and football games.
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Policy
Alternative
Perceived effect
Status Quo The right of non-believers to be free of religious coercion will remain 
protected. Government and religion will remain unentangled. 
Believers will perceive a restriction in their freedom of expression. 
Majority opinion and some state action will continue to be out of step 
with established Court doctrine. Believers will perceive a loss of 
tradition and moral value.
Daily Moment of 
Silence
Non-believers may perceive some mild coercion to take part in 
religious practices. Government will be acting in support of religious 
practice though it will not identify a specific sect or type of activity 
that is supported. The purpose of tiie law would be to advance 
religious practice, in violation of modem Establishment Clause 
interpretation. {Wallace v. Jajfree 472 U.S. 38) The free exercise of 
believers would be protected. Tradition would be preserved. There 
may be little or no effect on the moral education of the children who 
may need more guidance.
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Non-
Denominational, 
Non-Coercive, 
state-written 
daily prayer led 
by teachers
Non-believers may perceive subtle coercion. The state government 
would be directly involved in the overt support of a religious action. 
Engel V. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) would have to be overturned. There is 
inherent difficulty in writing a prayer with which all denominations 
would agree. Free exercise rights of believers would be protected. 
Tradition would be preserved. The prayer may have some effect on 
the moral education and values of children. The state’s involvement 
would preserve principles of federalism and community standards of 
morality. Involvement of facidty might violate Free Exercise rights 
of faculty and might lend undue state sanction to the activity.
Non-
Denominational, 
Non-Coercive 
daily prayer led 
by guest clergy
Non-believers may perceive coercion. The state government would 
be directly involved in the overt support of a religious action. Engel 
V. Vitale (370 U.S. 421) would have to be overturned. There is 
inherent difficulty in writing a law with which all denominations 
would agree. Free Exercise rights of believers would be protected, 
however some believers would object to the sectarian nature of guest 
clergy. Tradition would be preserved. The prayer may have some 
effect on the moral education and values of children. The state’s 
involvement would preserve principles or federalism and community 
standards of morality. This activity would seem to coincide with 
accepted government ceremonial usage of clergy.
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Non-
denominatîonal, 
Non-coercive, 
student-written 
and student-led 
daily prayer
Non-believers might perceive peer coercion. The state would be 
directly involved in support of an overt religious action. Free 
exercise rights of believers would be protected. Tradition would be 
preserved. The prayer may have some effect on the moral education 
and values of children. State involvement would preserve principles 
of federalism and community standards of morality. There are 
inherent problems in writing a prayer to which all denominations can 
agree. There are inherent problems in student volunteer selection and 
administrative approval of the prayer.
Community non- 
denominational, 
non-coercive 
prayer prepared 
by citizen board 
for reading by 
student 
volunteers
Non-believers may feel coercion. Majority sect of a community 
might exert undo influence over the creation of the accepted prayer. 
Free exercise rights of believers would be maintained. Tradition 
would be preserved. The prayer might have an effect on the moral 
education and values of children. The state’s involvement is 
marginal, but the state is still supporting a religious activity. There is 
an inherent problem with writing a prayer to which all denominations 
can agree. Principles of federalism and community standards are 
upheld. Largely secular communities could choose to have no prayer 
while religious communities could choose a prayer that suits their 
needs. Consistent with aspects of religious choice recently infused 
into the Establishment Clause interpretation. (Zelman v. Simmons- 
Harris 000 U.S. 000-1751) Majoritarian aspects of democracy would 
be maintained.
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Let it be noted that each alternative is riddled with problems, and that the 
difficulty in a democratic republic is to balance the rights of competing groups. Though 
the status quo is acceptable to separationists, prayer supporters find it distasteful and even 
dangerous. (Reichley 1986) None of the above policy alternatives suggests a return to 
colonial days of established religion, nor does any one of them suggest a completely 
sectarian approach to the problem of school prayer. Some changes would have to be 
made to established Supreme Court rulings regarding the conflict between school prayer 
and the Establishment Clause, but these changes might help to clarify the clause so that 
there is one, easily understandable definition that applies to all establishment cases. 
Instead, there is currently disagreement between Establishment cases involving school 
funding, such as Zelman (536 U.S. 639), and those involving prayer, such as Doe.
(530 U.S. 290)
Policy Proposal
Of the aforementioned policy objectives, one seems to be the best at balancing the 
rights of believers and non-believers, marrying the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses, and creating a more consistent view of the Establishment clause with regards to 
schools. That same proposals meets the main goals of the accomodationists; preserving 
tradition, imparting moral values, maintaining states’ rights, and protecting the fi-ee 
exercise of believers. Though it does not reach the ultimate goal of the separationists, 
removing religion from the school entirely, it should quell arguments over direct state 
involvement in religion and protection of the rights of non-believers. The policy of
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allowing communities to develop non-denominational, non-coercive prayer using a 
citizen board and student volunteers seems to be the best compromise between the two 
arguments.
The board could be organized by a vote at an open meeting, similar to a school 
board meeting. What is obvious in this situation is that the extremes of the two sides of 
the prayer debate will be at the meeting. Religious zealots from many denominations 
will be in attendance in order to protect perceived rights or to steer the discussion, 
deliberation and vote in a preferred direction. There is little doubt, at least in a diverse 
community, that all sides could be well represented on a board of approximately ten 
parents of students in the school, which is probably the smallest and most effective level 
for this type of activity. In a less diverse community, followers of marginal religious 
practices might be locked out of the process, even at the initial election stage, but their 
right to testify at the meeting would not be infringed.
In order to establish “community consensus,” the vote of the board should have to 
be a supermajority of 2/3, or 7 out of ten. This would insure that a convincing argument 
of a dissenter would have a decent chance in toppling the proposed prayer, or that a 
moderate amount of dissent by the board would be enough to push the prayer in a less 
offensive direction or abolish it altogether. The supermajority would force greater 
deliberation on content, style, tone, and delivery of the prayer in the school, and would 
also serve as a means to dull zealotry by opening the discussion to many different points 
of view. Those adamant that a prayer should be added might be swayed, by the 
impassioned arguments of others, into believing that a private, sectarian prayer group 
would be more appropriate for their children in that community. Others may decide that
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respect to other people’s beliefs in the community, including atheism and agnosticism,
would dictate much broader language than they would have originally intended.
Members of marginal faiths might be inclined to allow the activity if they were permitted
broad freedom in exempting their children.
The search here would e for fundamental truths that could bind the community
together rather than allowing the pull of religious dissension and zealotry to tear it apart.
If the community can come to no such consensus, perhaps the mere existence of the
board and the occurrence of the discussion will soften the divisions now being fed by
religious differences. As Jefferson wrote to Dr. Thomas Cooper,
In our annual report to the legislature, after stating the constitutional 
reasons against a public establishment of any religious instruction, we 
suggest the expediency of encouraging the different religious sects to 
establish, each for itself, a professorship of their own tenets, on the 
confines of the university, so near as that their students may attend the 
lectures there, and have the free use of our library, and every other 
accommodation we can give them; preserving, however, their 
independence of us and of each other. This fills the chasm objected to 
ours, as a defect in an institution professing to give instruction in all useful 
sciences. I think the invitation will be accepted, by some sects from candid 
intentions, and by others fi*om jealousy and rivalship. And by bringing the 
sects together, and mixing them with the mass of other students, we shall 
soften their asperities, liberalize and neutralize their prejudices, and make 
the general religion a religion of peace, reason, and morality. (Jefferson 
[1822]1984)
If no prayer results, perhaps the supporters will emerge more understanding of the 
concerns of their fellow citizens. If a prayer results, perhaps dissenters, given their 
opportunity to dissent respectfully, will retain a role in the overall religious debate and be 
recognized, by the community in which they have chosen to live, as holding legitimate 
beliefs worthy of expression at the least.
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Much of the Court’s current interpretation of the Establishment Clause includes a 
choice factor. For example, the Court found in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (536 U.S.
639) that the voucher program in Ohio did not violate the Establishment Clause mainly 
because the money was directed by parent choice and not by state assertion. The policy 
of allowing a community review board to write the state prayer allows parent choice on a 
community-wide level. An even broaden non-coercion doctrine than the one suggested by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Engel case would serve to create a second individual 
choice on behalf of the parent or student in question. The lower court, in Engel, forced 
the state to allow students to leave the room or to refrain from saying the prayer if a 
parent requested such accommodations. Teachers were to refrain from commenting on 
the students’ actions. (370 U.S. 421) Under the revised program students should be able 
to refrain from saying the prayer without the burden of parental request, and teachers 
would still be unable to comment. This would protect the rights of the non-believer or 
the dissenter to be free from government coercion in religious matters. It would be 
similar to the holding in West Virginia v. Barnette (319 U.S. 624), which allows students 
to refrain from the Pledge of Allegiance without comment from teachers.
The Free Exercise rights of believers to take part in traditional, ceremonial 
religious activity would be protected as well. Removing the teachers and administrators 
from the process frees the state of any excessive entanglement, while allowing student 
volunteers, selected, presumably, by the citizen board, would allow the students to 
practice their religion freely. In the case of Westside Community Board o f Education v. 
Mergens (496 U.S. 226), it was decided that students had the right to practice and study 
religion on school campus to the same extent that non-religious groups and individuals
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could express their own beliefs on that same campus. The key to avoiding the 
Establishment Clause issue in Mergens was to remove the school staff from the equation. 
Just as teacher are to act merely as supervisors for Bible clubs, their roles would become 
merely supervisory during the reading of the prayer. This also avoids a problem found in 
Engel, which was that students might become indoctrinated by religious activities if the 
person leading those activities was an authority figure. If the person leading the activity 
is a peer, there is little danger of indoctrination. (370 U.S. 421)
The act of having the prayer written and regulated by a community board would 
preserve the power of the states to set their own regulations and standards as well as the 
original interpretation of the Establishment Clause by its Framers. (Peterson 1963) The 
demographics of prayer supporters show that many of them live in concentrated areas, 
especially in the South. (Green and Guth 1989) Those areas with high concentrations of 
prayer supporters would be able to exercise their desire to have a brief, traditional, 
ceremonial religious activity in the school. Those areas with high levels of separationists 
would maintain the status quo. This would support the idea of a republican democracy 
that rules in accordance with majority opinion and with respect to minority rights.
Some may still argue that there may be some perception of coercion amongst non­
believers, but certainly, there is no Constitutional right against being offended. Under 
this plan, the state would have to remain neutral and the prayer could not be overtly 
coercive. More importantly, the rights of the minority must be balanced with those of the 
majority. The majority would give up its right to be coercive or to be overtly 
denominational, and the minority would have to be moderately tolerant of majority 
traditions. If there is to be a check on the non-denominational and non-coercive nature of
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the prayers, it must be the Courts. Since the Court would have to overturn precedent in 
order to allow this new plan to occur, it would have to establish a clear test for the non- 
denominational and non-coercive prayer so that prayers that violate this standard could 
still be challenged in court.
Conclusion
Since 1963, the debate over school prayer has been highly contentious. As
Elifson and Hadaway wrote:
Prayer and Bible reading in Public schools have led to three major 
Supreme Court decisions; they are the impetus for approximately 200 
constitutional amendments in the U.S. Congress, amendments designed to 
permit voluntary prayer in public schools or curtail federal court 
jurisdiction in school prayer cases. (1985)
Of course, the battle has continued since 1985, and the Republican Party still devotes a
platform plank to a proposed school prayer amendment. (Janda 1999) As divisive as the
issue is, there still may be some middle ground to stake out, a compromise that might
satisfy some of the requirements of both sides. It is necessary to find this answer, and a
non-denominational, non-coercive, community-created prayer might be a step in that
direction. As the Court further develops the interpretation of the Establishment Clause in
relation to school prayer, perhaps they will happen on a definition of the clause that is
consistent, coherent, and adheres to the fundamental principles and traditions of the
United States government.
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